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ABSTRACT  
 
After a decade of development, advanced telecommunications services (ATS) are widely available in 
many markets. This thesis is concerned with the impact of local competition and government 
regulation on the deployment of advanced telecommunications services for business in the United 
States. These services include packet switching, digital signal level (DS) technologies and 
synchronous optical network (SONET) – optical carrier (OC) transport. Increasingly, businesses are 
using these services for intra and extra network communications. Access to advanced 
telecommunication services is important for economic development. Government policy makers are 
interested in identifying what steps can be taken to accelerate the roll-out of services in their 
communities. Business and corporate users are often interested in services that are different from 
what the residential customers desire. 
  
This thesis focuses on a broader range of advanced services of interest to the business customers than 
most empirical research to date. It also provides a better and more insightful metric at a finer level of 
granularity to address these questions. The impacts of local business conditions, rivalry and 
regulations on the deployment of advanced telecommunication services are analyzed by means of 
econometric analysis. A rich data set has been constructed which identifies the competitive, 
regulatory and economic climates at each incumbent’s wire center in the United States. A qualitative 
response model is used to estimate how business characteristics of the communities and their 
regulatory environments affect the deployment of ATS. I conclude that local competition, federal 
subsidies, 271 approval, and high unbundled network element (UNE) price to book cost ratio have 
positive impacts on advanced telecommunication services deployment, while federal price cap 
regulation and location in a rural area have negative impacts. These findings have significant 
implications on government regulatory policies. 
   
The thesis recommends regulatory policies, which focus on services, such as rate-based rate-of-return 
regulation over price caps and encourages competitors’ entry, facilities-based competition and 
federal support to accelerate deployment of advanced telecommunications services. It concludes by 
encouraging governments and organizations to support more research, experimentation and better 
data collection to increase understanding of underlying socio-economic and regulatory factors 
affecting deployment of advanced telecommunications services.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Broadband is a term that originated from the characterization of a communication 
channel’s capacity. Broadband and its deployment have grown in importance over the 
past decades with government officials, regulatory agencies, business and the general 
public as its penetration increases in the United States of America.1,2 Advanced 
telecommunications capability is the availability of high-speed, switched, broadband 
telecommunications that enables users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, 
graphics, and video using any technology, as defined by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC). They include services such as packet switching, digital signal level 
(DS) technologies, frame relay, Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and synchronous 
optical network (SONET) – optical carrier (OC) transport. Such availability have the 
potential to improve education, enhance access to health care services and information, 
create better jobs and living conditions.  
 
In this thesis, we will be primarily concerned with the impact of local competition and 
government regulation on the deployment of advanced telecommunications services 
(ATS) for business in the United States. Broadband services are widely available in many 
markets after a decade of development. Businesses are increasingly using these services 
for intra and extra network communications. Access to advanced telecommunication 
services is important for economic development. Government policy makers are 
interested in identifying what steps can be taken to accelerate the roll-out of services in 
                                                 
1 Broadband subscription to high-speed Internet access in the US will have topped 10 million by the end of 
the third quarter 2002, according to a new survey by the National Cable and Telecommunications 
Association. The report shows that subscriptions grew by 2.8 million in the first nine months of 2002. 
 
2 According to “Report on the Availability of High-Speed and Advanced Telecommunications Capability” 
released by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on February 7, 2002, there were 
approximately 9.6 million high-speed (including advanced services) subscribers, as of June 30, 2001, a 
36% increase during the first half of 2001 and a 250% increase from the FCC Second Report issued in 
August 2000, (which included data from 18 months ago, December 31, 1999). In addition, there were 
approximately 5.9 million advanced services subscribers, as of June 30, 2001, a 38% increase during the 
first half of 2001. 
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their community. Business and corporate users are often interested in services that are 
different from what the residential customers desire.  
 
     
1.1 Related Work 
 
Before evaluating the impact of local competition and regulation on broadband services 
available to end-users, we review different ways in which previous studies have analyzed 
these issues. While most empirical research to date, for example the FCC research, 
addresses the availability of cable modem and xdsl service for residential subscribers, this 
thesis will focus on a broader range of services of interest to business customers, 
including services such as packet switching, digital signal service level technologies and 
SONET – OC transport. Another point to note is that currently, the FCC’s broadband data 
set is reported at the zip code level by billing address while this thesis studies the 
availability of service by address. The difference can be illustrated by the following 
example: assume that Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) totally encompasses 
four zip codes - no other organization or individual reside in the area associated with the 
four zip codes. However, all the invoices are sent to one billing office and the billing 
office is associated with only one zip code.  The FCC would report that services are 
billed at the one zip code and would report that service was not available at the other 
three zip codes (because no one is billed at the other three zip codes). My study 
overcomes this flaw because availability is defined in terms of geographical area covered 
by an incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC) wire center.  
 
In terms of competition data, FCC provides a list of geographical zip codes where 
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) have reported providing local exchange 
service to at least one customer as of June 30, 2002.3 The list only denotes one to three 
CLECs reporting service to at least one customer in the zip code but this research 
contains fields in the data set that record the exact numbers of competitors (for example, 
                                                 
3 Refer to FCC 2002 report on competition at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/czip0602.pdf  (The information is from data reported to the FCC in Form 477.) 
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one, two or three), which are not shown in the FCC report. This research focuses on 
facilities- based competitors that appear in the Local Exchange Routing Guide (LERG)4 
and presents competition data that is further aggregated to 3, 5, 7 or 10 miles, which are 
more relevant and meaningful than just the number in one zip code.  
 
Furthermore, most studies on the impact of competition and government regulation on 
infrastructure investments have focused on such metrics as the percentage of digital 
switching machines or length of fiber optic sheath within a state. For example, the FCC 
Monitoring Report (2002)5 provides switching system data, gross plant expenditures 
covering all types of plant and transmission system data to illustrate the rapid 
development of fiber capacity in terms of terminations, sheath kilometers, and links. The 
data is reported for each of the regional Bell operating companies (along with Verizion’s 
GTE companies) with aggregated summary data for all the reporting companies. 
However, there are shortcomings to such observations based on facility deployment 
measurements. Firstly, end-users are most concerned about the types of services available 
to them over the fiber, not the particular type of facility deployed. Secondly, patterns of 
investment may vary significantly within a company, or within a state. These two 
situations are usually aggregated together in prior research works and this obscures some 
important variation in the data. It is necessary to have a better and more insightful metric 
at a finer level of granularity. This work, unlike those prior studies, focuses on the types 
of services that are provided over the facilities, rather than on facilities.   
 
Other related literatures on the impact of local competition on broadband services 
available to end-users include a paper by Tomlinson (1994) on the impact of local 
                                                 
4 The Local Exchange Routing Guide (LERG) is a comprehensive routing data produced by Telcordia™ 
Routing Administration (TRA). The data supports the current local exchange network configuration within 
the North American Numbering Plan (NANP) and identifies reported planned changes in the network. The 
LERG is primarily designed to be used for 1) routing of inter-LATA calls by inter-exchange carriers; 2) 
providing information on the local environment for the numerous carriers involved in the local arena; and 
3) any other company needing information about the network, numbering, and other data in the product. 
 
5 FCC Universal Service Monitoring Report, Section 10, CC Docket Number 98-202, October 2002 (with 
data received through April 2002). http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/monitor.html 
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competition on network quality.6 The paper asserts that more stringent, quantitative 
quality standards become more necessary as the strategic importance of business 
communications increases and as networks evolve to incorporate digital data and 
multiplexed voice transport. It further argues that if a digital line carrying critical data 
experiences bit errors due to a high noise environment, significant financial losses will 
result. It concludes by pointing out that the high-volume end-users and inter-exchange 
carriers (IXC) using dedicated access circuits in major urban centers have experienced 
increased network quality as both local exchange carriers (LECs) and Alternate Local 
Transport (ALT) companies or Competitive Access Providers (CAPs) have competed for 
their business and have provided self-healing fiber transport. The attainment of a high 
level of operational cooperation among network operators in a fully competitive 
environment is a more important factor than network technology and architecture in 
future network quality.  
 
A lot of analysts have studied the choices and effects of certain regulatory plans on the 
deployment of digital technologies in the telecommunications industry. Donald and 
Sappington (1995) argued that a state is more likely to adopt incentive regulation when 
residential basic local service rates have historically been high; allowed earning under 
rate-of-return regulation in the state have been either particularly high or low; the state’s 
leaders tend to come from both political parties, rather than from a single party; and the 
bypass activity of competitors in the state is less pronounced.7 Another empirical study 
by Kridel, Sappington and Weisman (1996) concludes that under incentive regulation, 
productivity, infrastructure investment, profit levels, telephone penetration and new 
service offerings have increased. Service penetration rates have generally remained stable 
or decreased slightly while service quality does not appear to have been affected 
                                                 
6 Tomlinson, Richard G. (1994), The Impact of Local Competition on Network Quality, Connecticut 
Research. 
 
7 Donald, Stephen G., and David E.M. Sappington (1995), Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans 
in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 4, 
Number 2, 237-265. 
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adversely.8 Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller (1995) have found that price regulation and 
in particular, price caps is a more potent regulatory mechanism for infrastructure 
deployment by local exchange carriers than the standard earning sharing scheme. 
Secondly, when associated with an earnings sharing scheme, price regulation is less 
effective in triggering infrastructure deployment than when it is implemented by itself.9 
The unit of observation here was a company’s operation in a state, while this study 
focuses on the micro level of geographical area covered by an ILEC wire center.       
 
Willig, Lehr, Bigelow and Levinson (2002) argued that neither theory nor empirical data 
supports the ILEC argument that mandatory unbundling provision hinders ILEC 
investment.10 These authors estimated that a 1% unbundled network element (UNE) rate 
reduction corresponds with approximately a 2.1% to 2.9% ILEC investment increase and 
concluded that unbundling of ILEC networks promotes competition, and thereby 
stimulates investment in telecommunications infrastructure by incumbents and entrants 
alike.  
 
The report prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) on “The Development of Broadband Access in OECD Countries”  (2001) 
concluded that the current bottleneck to growth in the communications sector is the 
limitations of local access networks.11 These limitations are not just technological but 
also include the inheritance of many decades of monopoly provision of access networks - 
                                                 
8 Kridel, Donald, David E.M. Sappington, and Dennis L. Weisman (1996), The Effects of Incentive 
Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry: A Survey, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 9:269-306 
 
9 Greenstein, Shane M., Susan McMaster, and Pablo T. Spiller (1995), The Effect of Incentive Regulation 
on Infrastructure Modernization: Local Exchange Companies’ Deployment of Digital Technology, Journal 
of Economics and Management Strategy, Volume 4, Number 2, 187-236 
  
10 Willig, Robert D., William H. Lehr, John P. Bigelow, and Stephen B. Levinson (2002), Stimulating 
Investment and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
 
11 This public report was prepared by Dr. Sam Paltridge of the OECD’s Directorate for Science, 
Technology and Industry and published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. This 
report was presented to the Working Party on Telecommunications and Information Services Policy in June 
2001, and was recommended to be made public by the Committee for Information, Computer and 
Communications Policy (ICCP) in October 2001. 
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there is usually only one or two networks passing most businesses in OECD countries 
and in certain cases, these networks are owned by the same company. For OECD 
governments, infrastructure competition is the key to increasing broadband access. 
Another necessary step is the opening up of network elements, of players in dominant 
positions, to competitive forces. Policies such as unbundling local loops and line sharing 
are key regulatory tools available to create the right incentives for new investment in 
broadband access. The OECD concluded that opening access networks, and network 
elements, to competitive forces increases investment and the pace of development.  
      
 
1.2 Thesis Overview 
 
Chapter 2 discusses in detail some of the advanced telecommunications or broadband 
technologies used in business, how and why they are used, including packet switching, 
digital signal service level technologies (DS), frame relay, Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
(ATM) and Synchronous Optical Network (SONET).  
 
Chapter 3 will discuss briefly the impact of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on 
competition in local telecommunications services provision. This will set the stage for the 
discussion on the effect of local competition and regulation on broadband services 
available to end-users.   
   
Chapter 4 describes the data sources and data sets collected. It highlights their 
importance and describes the different fields of the data set. It will briefly describe the 
accuracy and validity of the data sets and their sources.  
 
This chapter will also attempt to address the following questions: i) if competition has a 
positive impact on the availability of advanced telecommunications services – according 
to Farrell and Katz (1998), innovation may occur more rapidly in a monopoly 
environment because the monopolist can capture all the rents associated with their efforts 
and therefore, sharing of the incumbents’ facilities raises difficult issues for innovation 
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incentives,12 while Woroch’s study (1998) supports the claim that facilities-based entry 
stimulates investment by both incumbents and entrants;13 and ii) how different regulatory 
environments affect the behavior of the local exchange companies.    
 
In order to examine these issues, a data set has been constructed that will allow for the 
econometric analysis of the above hypotheses. The econometric model needs to control 
for i) advanced telecommunications services availabilities such as packet switching 
(ATM is subsumed under this category), DS technologies and SONET – OC transport, by 
wire center (years 1994-2001); ii) local competition data (C++ program was written to 
find the number of wire centers served by competitive providers, located within X mile 
radius of wire centers served by an incumbent); iii) economic and demographic data by 
wire center from the 1990 census and forecasted census data for subsequent years; iv) 
business data by wire center, including ownership of wire centers; number of employees 
and payroll; number of small, medium and large type of business by standard industrial 
code; and v) regulatory environments. An explanation of the various variables and why 
they are included will also be described in this section.   
  
Chapter 5 builds on the previous chapter and describes the econometric models used to 
test the hypotheses and determine the results, based on the data sets described in the 
previous chapter. Besides explaining important concepts, equations and assumptions 
embedded in the models, this chapter also analyzes the results and presents the findings 
based on the econometric models and regression analyses. It will restate and summarize 
the conclusions to the hypotheses tested: i) if competition has a positive impact on the 
availability of advanced telecommunications services; ii) if regulation affects the 
behavior of the firms and if regulatory measures can directly increase the benefits (e.g. 
more advanced services available) of consumers.  
 
                                                 
12 Farrell, Joseph, and Michael L. Katz (1998), Public Policy and Private Investment in Advanced 
Telecommunications Infrastructure, IEEE Communications Magazine 
 
13 Woroch, Glenn A. (1998), Facilities Competition and Local Network Investment: Theory, Evidence and 
Policy Implications, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 7 601-614  
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Chapter 6 discusses the policy implication of the findings and suggests 
recommendations. It will attempt to answer question such as if entry stimulates new 
services by ILECs and make suggestions on regulatory policies to increase competition of 
local loop and provision of advanced data services for businesses. It will serve as a 
conclusion to the thesis and suggest possible directions for future research. 
 
 
1.3 Summary of Findings and Recommendations  
 
In summary, using the econometric tools and analyses presented in this thesis to evaluate 
the factors that affect the deployment of services by ILECs, we found:  
 
1. The presence of CLECs has a strong positive impact on ILECs’ tariff offering of 
advanced telecommunications services – packet switching, DS and OC, with ATS 
availabilities (and level of advanced services) highest within vicinities of large 
cities where there are a lot of competition from CLECs (Section 5.3.2.1). 
 
2. The availability of tariff offering of packet switching is positively correlated to 
wire centers owned by Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) and 
medium size firms, with RBOC ownership showing slightly stronger affect. The 
availability of a more advanced service like DS3 is also positively correlated to 
RBOC and medium size firm ownerships, with medium size firm ownership 
showing slightly stronger affect. This shows that RBOCs have less incentive to 
provide DS3 services than medium size firms. OC availability is positively 
correlated to RBOC ownership but negatively correlated to medium size firm 
ownership, suggesting that OC is the level of ATS that the RBOCs are providing 
while the medium size firms usually do not provide OC (Section 5.3.3.1).  
 
3. There are strong negative correlations between federal price cap regulation and 
availabilities of packet switching, DS and OC services (Section 5.3.3.2).  
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4. Location of wire center in a rural area has strong negative correlation with the 
availabilities of packet switching, DS and OC services. All else equal, if classified 
as rural (by FCC), lower likelihood of that ATS is provided (Section 5.3.3.2).  
 
5. The availability of subsidized loans indeed accelerates the availabilities of 
advanced telecommunications services. The presence of Rural Utilities Services 
(RUS) support on the firms is found to have a strong positive correlation with the 
availabilities of packet switching, DS3 and OC services (Section 5.3.3.2). 
 
6. The Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) must file applications with the FCC on a 
state-by-state basis in order to provide in-region inter-LATA services under 
Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934 – known as the 271 approval 
process. This process yields a significant positive impact on the development of 
local competition. 271 approvals by the FCC have strong positive impact on the 
deployment of packet switching and DS3 services but show negative impacts on 
the deployment of OC services (Section 5.3.3.3).  
 
7. To examine the impact of unbundled network element (UNE) prices on the 
deployment of advanced telecommunications services, we focus on the RBOCs. 
We found that the availabilities of packet switching, DS3 and OC have strong 
positive correlation to the ratio of forward-looking UNE prices to their embedded 
costs. In other words, the RBOCs and other ILECs are more likely to deploy ATS 
in states where the ratio of UNE prices to embedded costs is relatively high 
(Section 5.3.3.4).  
 
Based on these findings, the following policies are recommended (Section 6.2):  
 
1. Proactively take steps to promote accelerated deployment of advanced 
telecommunications services, especially at the local level. 
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2. Encourage new market entrants and local competition to accelerate roll-out of 
advanced telecommunications services.   
 
3. Construct regulatory policy framework in such a way as to place more emphasis 
on facilities-based competition over unbundling. 
 
4. Use appropriate policy instruments to address the gaps where facilities-based 
competition is unlikely to occur or may occur slowly, such as using rate-based 
rate-of-return regulation over price caps. 
 
5. Understand the impact of mandates in the 1996 Telecommunications Act such as 
the 271 approval test on deployment of ATS and utilize such policy instruments 
appropriately. 
 
6. Formulation of future regulation should focus on service rather than on particular 
transmission technology. 
 
7. More efforts should be made to accelerate ATS deployment, especially in rural 
areas through grants and loans from organizations such as RUS.    
 
8. Governments should support more research and development on access 
technologies, especially targeting the needs of non-incumbent players and areas 
that are not normally accessible to secure, private sector funding. 
 
9. Encourage and support continued efforts on more comprehensive and up-to-date 
data collection and research on the underlying socio-economic, political and 
regulatory factors of advanced telecommunications services deployment. 
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2  TECHNOLOGICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
Advanced telecommunications service is a term defined by the FCC to describe a range 
of high-bandwidth technologies developed for the transmission and delivery of high-
speed data communication services targeted at business and residential end-users. The 
technology behind these advanced telecommunications services is one of the most 
important drivers (or constraints) of how such services can be deployed in terms of their 
availabilities, economics and cost issues. An understanding of the different advanced 
telecommunications technologies incorporated in the data set, why and how businesses 
use these technologies, is therefore crucial in our understanding of the deployment of 
advanced telecommunications services.  
 
 
 
2.1 Need for Advanced Telecommunications Services 
 
Network can be broadly characterized as private or public networks. The private network 
is usually owned by a single organization or company while the public network is usually 
owned by common carriers such as the local phone companies. Private networks often 
use local area network (LAN) technology with multiple LANs linked together in a 
building or campus and it operates autonomously from other networks such as the 
Internet. Business organizations are responsible for managing their own private networks 
by purchasing their own equipment, hiring network managers to design, implement, 
maintain and upgrade their networks. These private networks often need to be extended 
as large organizations may have multiple buildings or campuses. They may contract for 
leased lines from common carriers. In contrast, the public network is operated by 
common carriers, which may include local telephone companies or other organizations 
that build networks out of leased lines. Several business organizations may subscribe and 
connect to the public network. The data transits public network to other organizations.   
 
High-bandwidth technologies and services are essential for businesses primarily due to 
the increased traffic on the private and public networks: local LAN segments; inter-
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networking between local and remote LAN segments; and increasingly high-bandwidth 
business applications for computing and exchange of information and services. 
 
There have been increasing terminal-to-host communications and file sharing 
applications in businesses occurring over LANs such as ARCnet, Ethernet and token ring. 
Coupled with the increased awareness and knowledge of LAN capabilities, the number of 
LAN users has significantly increased. Traffic per user has risen as well. These factors 
have contributed to the overall increase in traffic on LANs. Using routers or bridges, 
network managers in companies have frequently redistributed the increased data and 
information transfer by segmenting a large LAN into smaller sub-networks. However, 
once the network capacity is reached, a higher-bandwidth solution is critical to the 
continued operation of these businesses.  
 
Distributed computing architecture constituted another source for increased inter-network 
traffic or LAN-to-LAN communication in companies. Solutions with less bandwidth like 
56 Kbps leased lines had to be replaced by higher capacity DS solutions such as T-1 
lines. These T-1 lines are comparatively more expensive and the distributed computing 
architecture often requires several T-1 lines at once. Cost of point-to-point circuits is an 
important consideration – economical and high-bandwidth LAN or wide area network 
(WAN) have become increasingly essential in businesses. 
 
Business computing and desktop operations like computer-aided design (CAD), 
computer-aided manufacturing (CAM), complex mathematical computation and 
modeling and large database files have pushed the capacities of LANs and WANs to their 
maximum. Sometimes, time-sensitive applications such as multimedia and biomedical 
applications demand large bandwidth and low end-to-end delay. These applications again 
call for advanced telecommunications services in business operations. 
 
Essentially, advanced telecommunications services for business consist of a few different 
modalities, which different businesses may select from based on needs, prices, capacities 
and complexity concerns. These modalities include direct connection from a business’ 
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facilities to either one another or to long-distance carriers or Internet service providers 
(ISPs). For example, businesses manage and purchase their own circuits in the case of DS 
or SONET – OC transport, and businesses outsource the networks and purchase access 
from common carriers in the case of frame relay or ATM. A brief comparison between 
frame relay and ATM and the reasons for choosing them are shown in Table 2.1 below. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Comparison between Frame Relay and ATM 
 
                  Frame Relay    Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) 
Speed and bandwidth  
Good performance  
 
Cost-effectiveness  
Reliability  
Consolidated line for data, voice and video 
Low-entry price point   
 
Higher speed and bandwidth  
Better performance with inherent  
quality of service (QoS) support   
Less cost-effective  
Higher reliability  
Better consolidation for data, voice and video 
High-entry price point  
 
 
 
In summary, a retail or wholesale business customer may just need more bandwidth. It 
may seek a form of transport such as DS or the higher capacity, more flexible SONET – 
OC. In this situation, the role of the ILEC is limited – it merely rents out a share of its 
network. Therefore, we broadly categorize the forms of transport into DS and OC. 
Alternatively, if the business customer needs some network intelligence on top of 
bandwidth, it may choose packet switching – using frame relay or ATM, in which the 
ILEC provides certain level of switching, network and security control. Here, the 
business customer is facing a decision tree where it decides in the first stage whether only 
bandwidth or some network intelligence is required. If only bandwidth is required, it then 
decides between DS or OC but if some level of network intelligence is necessary, packet 
switching is a sensible option. 
     
 24 
These advanced telecommunications technologies and network services such as packet 
switching, DS, frame relay, ATM and OC, summarized in Table 2.2 on the next page, are 
critical to businesses as they offer high bandwidth and favorable economics in the 
increasingly complex and networked business environments. 
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Table 2.2: Brief Overview of Specialized Digital Network Services/ Technologies 
 
Network Services/ 
Technologies 
Examples of Tariff 
Products 
Areas Typically 
Used  
How Used 
Packet Switching  
 
Access concentrator 
functions: collects 
customer data from 
many access lines 
and provides 
concentration for 
delivery to the 
packet switch and 
vice versa  
Medium to large 
organizations, 
ISPs, Telcos 
Protocols in which 
messages are broken 
up into small packets 
and transmitted 
Digital Signal Level 
(DS) Technology – 
DS1, DS3 etc. (Also 
known as T-1, T-3)  
High capacity 
multiplexing: 
DS0 – 64 Kbps 
DS1 – 1.544 Mbps 
DS3 – 44.736 Mbps 
Medium to large 
organizations, 
ISPs, Telcos 
Backbones and 
access to long 
distance companies 
and ISPs 
Frame Relay14  Connection-oriented 
frame transport 
services: 
64 Kbps to 44.736 
Mbps 
Medium to large 
commercial 
customers 
Public and primarily 
data network service 
for LAN to LAN 
connections 
Asynchronous 
Transfer Mode 
(ATM)15 
 
Data switching 
services: 
56 Kbps to  
622 Mbps 
Telcos, ISPs, 
large 
organizations 
such as major 
universities 
To switch high-
usage backbone 
voice, video and data 
traffic 
Synchronous Optical 
Network (SONET) – 
Optical Carrier (OC) 
Data transmission: 
Up to 129,000 
channels on fiber 
optic cable 
Telcos Provides extra 
reliability to large 
companies or 
corporate users. 
Transports voice, 
video and data traffic 
at high speeds over 
fiber networks 
 
                                                 
14 Frame relay is generally subsumed under the packet switching category in our study. 
 
15 ATM is also generally subsumed under the packet switching category in our study. 
 26 
2.2 Packet Switching  
 
Business inter-networks usually consist of a collection of servers, workstations and LANs 
linked together through WANs. Various switching technologies and services, such as 
packet switching and circuit switching connect the business end-user equipment to the 
network.  
Packet switching refers to protocols in which messages are broken up into small packets 
before they are sent. Each packet is transmitted individually across the net, and may even 
follow different routes to the destination. Thus, each packet has header information about 
the source, destination, packet numbering, etc. At the destination, the packets are 
reassembled into the original message. Most modern WAN protocols, such as TCP/IP, 
X.25 and frame relay, are based on packet switching technologies.  
While most modern WAN protocols are based on packet switching technologies, normal 
telephone service is based on a circuit switching technology, in which a dedicated line is 
allocated for transmission between two parties. For example, when a telephone call is 
placed, various LEC and IXC switching systems establish a connection between the 
calling and the receiving parties. Once the connection is set up, the remote telephone 
rings and the end-to-end connection is complete when the receiving party answers the 
call. Circuit switching is ideal when data must be transmitted quickly and arrive in 
sequencing order at a constant arrival rate. This is the case with transmitting real time 
data, such as the phone conversation. Packet switching is more efficient and robust for 
data that is bursty in its nature, and can withstand delays in transmission, such as e-mail 
messages, and web pages. Figure 2.1 on the next page illustrates some of the differences 
between packet switching and circuit switching technologies. 
 Figure 2.1: Comparison of Packet Switching and Circuit Switching Technologies  
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one connection from the start to the end, and it only becomes available when that 
connection is terminated. For example, in Figure 2.2, if a connection between points A 
and B is required, a circuit can be set up through S1, S3, S4 and S5. Other routes are 
possible to allow for resilience, and the connections between the switches may consist of 
more than one circuit to allow for the set-up of multiple circuits at the same time.  
 
Figure 2.2: Comparison of Packet-switched and Circuit-switched Networks (Source: O2) 
 
 
Two basic techniques are usually found in packet switching: i) virtual circuit packet 
switching; and ii) datagram switching. 
 
2.2.1 Virtual Circuit Packet Switching Networks 
 
In virtual circuit packet switching, an initial setup phase is used to set up a route between 
the intermediate nodes for all the packets passed during the session between the two end 
nodes. In each intermediate node, an entry is registered in a table to indicate the route for 
the connection that has been set up. Thus, packets passed through this route, can have 
short headers, containing only a virtual circuit identifier (VCI), and not their destination. 
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Each intermediate node passes the packets according to the information that was stored in 
it, in the setup phase.  
In this way, packets arrive at the destination in the correct sequence, and it is guaranteed 
that essentially there will not be errors. This approach is slower than circuit switching, 
since different virtual circuits may compete over the same resources, and an initial setup 
phase is needed to initiate the circuit. As in circuit switching, if an intermediate node 
fails, all virtual circuits that pass through it are lost. The most common forms of virtual 
circuit networks are X.25 and frame relay, which are commonly used for public data 
network (PDN). 
 
2.2.2 Datagram Packet Switching Networks 
 
Datagram packet switching adopts a different, more dynamic scheme, to determine the 
route through the network links. Each packet is treated as an independent entity, and its 
header contains full information about the destination of the packet. The intermediate 
nodes examine the header of the packet, and decide to which node to send the packet so 
that it will reach its destination. In this decision, two factors are taken into account:  
• The shortest way to pass the packet to its destination - protocols such as 
RIP/OSPF are used to determine the shortest path to the destination.  
• Finding a free node to pass the packet to - in this way, bottlenecks are eliminated, 
since packets can reach the destination in alternate routes.  
In this approach, the packets do not follow a pre-established route, and the intermediate 
nodes (the routers) do not have pre-defined knowledge of the routes that the packets 
should be passed through. Packets can follow different routes to the destination, and 
delivery is not guaranteed although packets usually do follow the same route and are 
transmitted reliably. Due to the nature of this method, the packets can reach the 
destination in a different order than they were sent, thus they must be sorted at the 
destination to form the original message. This approach is time consuming since every 
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router has to decide where to send each packet. The main implementation of Datagram 
Switching Network is the Internet, which uses the IP network protocol.  
 
 
2.3 Digital Signal Level (DS) Technology 
 
Digital Signal Level (DS) is the speed at which various T-1, T-3 and fractions of these 
speeds run. T-1 is also referred to as DS-1, which consists of 24 DS-0. The DS-1 service 
is a high capacity, point-to-point, line service that transmits simultaneous full-duplex 
digital signals at the entire bandwidth of the circuit, 1.544 megabits between a company 
designated point-of-presence (POP) in one exchange area and a company designated 
point-of-presence in another exchange area. DS-1 could also serve two customers or 
buildings in the same exchange area (that is, the DS-1 link does not have to connect to 
another exchange area). For example, ISPs use primary rate interfaces (DS-1) to connect 
their modem banks to the public switched network.  Access to this service is only through 
dedicated access, which refers to an access line service consisting of a continuously 
connected circuit between a company’s premises or serving telephone company central 
office and a company terminal, available on a full-time, unshared, basis, which is used for 
the origination or termination of services. The DS-0 service transmits at the speed of each 
channel of the T-1 circuit, 64Kbps.   
 
Although each channel of T-1 is 64Kbps, the entire bandwidth of the circuit is higher 
than 24 x 64,000 or 1,536,000. The extra 8000 bits are used for synchronization to keep 
the timing set between frames, which denote a transmission where bits from each of the 
24 channels have been sampled and put onto the T-1 line. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
2.3.1 Time Division Multiplexing and Limitations 
 
T carrier signals are based on time division multiplexing, where every device sending 
signal through a T-1 line is given a time slot. If there are four telephones all competing 
for the same T-1 circuit, time slots are assigned to each telephone for the length of the 
phone call. The same applies to personal computers (PCs). If a PC stops sending for 
duration of time, the slot will not be reassigned to another computer – the allocated time 
slot will be transmitted without any bits. This is quite inefficient in its utilization of the 
WAN as idle time slots and wasted bandwidth will result from pauses in data 
transmission (Figure 2.3).     
 
 
Figure 2.3: Illustration of Wasted Time Slots in a Time Division Multiplexing Circuit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                
In contrast, Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) uses newer transmission techniques 
that do not allocate individual time slots to every device – only transmitted bits use 
bandwidth. This guarantees a much more efficient transmission capacity and bandwidth 
use.        
 
 
A B C D
Servers 
A
B
C
D
Time -
Division 
Multiplexer 
Time -
Division 
Multiplexer 
End-user 
Computers  
No data in 
time slots  
B & D  
Time slots 
 32 
2.4 Frame Relay   
 
Frame relay is a public network that allows businesses to transmit data between multiple 
locations. It uses a streamed lined Data Link Layer protocol, often compared to X.25. It 
provides a relatively simple, connection-oriented frame transport service commonly used 
to replace private lines in mesh topology networks (as illustrated by Figure 2.4 below). 
Using frame relay, business organizations reduce the need to plan, construct and maintain 
their own duplicate paths to each of their sites.  
 
Most LECs and IXCs provide frame relay service as a tariffed offering. Both intra- and 
inter-LATA services are available. It acts as a virtual, private dedicated network service 
without requiring businesses to lease their own dedicated lines and provides a good 
alternative to businesses constructing their own private data networks. Access rates range 
from fractional T-1 (n x 56/64Kbps) to DS1 (1.544 Mbps) to higher rates like DS3 
(44.736 Mbps).    
 
Figure 2.4: A Simple Frame Relay Network that Connects Different Devices to Various Services 
across WAN (Source: Cisco Systems Inc.) 
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2.5 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)   
ATM is the abbreviation for Asynchronous Transfer Mode, a network technology that is 
an International Telecommunication Union – Telecommunications Standards Section 
(ITU-T) standard for information transfer, whereby information of various types, such as 
voice, video, or data, is transmitted in small, fixed-size cells or packets. In this study, 
ATM is subsumed under the packet switching category. The cell used with ATM is 
relatively small compared to units used with older technologies. The small, constant cell 
size allows ATM equipment to transfer audio, video and computer data over the same 
network, and assures that no single type of data hogs the line. Figure 2.5 below illustrates 
a private ATM network and a public ATM network for businesses carrying voice, video, 
and data traffic. 
 
Figure 2.5: Private ATM Network and Public ATM Network Carrying Voice, Video and Data 
Traffic (Source: Cisco Systems Inc.) 
 
 
 
ATM is a connection-oriented service for both LAN and WAN applications. While some 
people believe that ATM holds the answer to the Internet bandwidth problem, others are 
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skeptical. An ATM network consists of a set of ATM switches interconnected by point-
to-point ATM interfaces or links. ATM creates a fixed channel, or route, between two 
points whenever data transfer begins. This differs from TCP/IP, in which messages are 
divided into packets and each packet can take a different route from source to destination. 
This difference makes it easier to track and bill data usage across an ATM network, but it 
makes it less adaptable to sudden surges in network traffic. Nearly all major LECs and 
IXCs currently develop ATM products and services.  Figure 2.6 below illustrates the 
ATM network and interface architecture for private and public networks.  
 
Figure 2.6: ATM Network and Interface Architecture for Private and Public Networks (Source: 
Cisco Systems Inc.) 
 
 
 
ATM technology attempts to combine the advantages offered by the circuit switching and 
packet switching transmission protocols – the guaranteed delivery of circuit-switched 
networks and the robustness and efficiency of packet-switched networks. 
When businesses are purchasing ATM services, there are generally four different types of 
services for selection:  
1) Constant Bit Rate (CBR) specifies a fixed bit rate so that data is sent in a steady 
stream. This is analogous to a leased line.  
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2) Variable Bit Rate (VBR) provides a specified average throughput capacity but 
data is not sent evenly. This is a popular choice for voice and videoconferencing 
data.  
3) Unspecified Bit Rate (UBR) does not guarantee any throughput levels. This is 
used for applications, such as file transfer, that can tolerate delays. 
4) Available Bit Rate (ABR) provides a guaranteed minimum capacity but allows 
data to be bursted at higher capacities when the network is free.  
 
 
2.6 High-Speed Transport - Synchronous Optical Network (SONET)  
SONET stands for Synchronous Optical Network. SONET was proposed by Bellcore in 
the middle 1980s and is now an ANSI standard. As communication between different 
networks often requires complicated multiplexing (or demultiplexing), coding (or 
decoding) processes to convert a signal from one format to another format, SONET offers 
a solution by standardizing their rates and formats. It is a standard way to interconnect 
high-speed traffic from multiple vendors. The Synchronous Transport Signal (STS) is the 
basic building block of SONET optical interfaces. The STS consists of two parts, the STS 
load, which carries business data information and the STS overhead, which carries the 
signaling and protocol information. At one end of the communication system, signals 
with various rates and formats are fed into the SONET multiplexer equipment. A signal is 
converted to STS and transmits through various SONET networks in the STS format until 
it terminates. The terminating equipment converts the STS back to the standard user 
format. Figure 2.7 on the next page illustrates this standardization process.  
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Figure 2.7: Standardization Achieved by a Synchronous Optical Network (SONET)   
 
 
 
 
Whereas ATM is a switching and multiplexing technique, SONET is a transport device 
using fiber optic cabling. SONET defines interface standards at the physical layer of the 
Open System Interconnection (OSI) seven-layer model. The standard defines a hierarchy 
of interface rates that allow data streams at different rates to be multiplexed. ATM is a 
Layer 2 service as it performs switching, addressing and error checking. SONET is a 
Layer 1 service. Layer 1 functions define interfaces to physical media such as copper and 
fiber optic cabling. SONET takes data and transports it at high speeds called optical 
carrier (OC) speeds. SONET links transport data from ATM switches, T-1 and T-3 
multiplexers.  
SONET establishes OC levels from 51.8 Mbps (about the same as a T-3 line) to 2.48 
Gbps. Prior rate standards used by different countries specified rates that were not 
compatible for multiplexing. With the implementation of SONET, communication 
carriers throughout the world can interconnect their existing digital carrier and fiber optic 
systems. 
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Reliability can be achieved with higher speeds derived from the fiber network. In contrast 
to a copper cut which only impacts one customer, a failure in the SONET ring which 
serves major police departments, armed forces units, hospitals or civilian organizations 
can have severe and adverse impacts on the health, safety, national security and important 
daily functions of those communities. To increase the level of reliability, SONET 
deployment often uses a ring topology – one set of fiber strands serves to send and 
receive while the other serves as a spare. If one set of fiber strands is disconnected or 
damaged due to any reasons, the traffic will be rerouted through the spare set in the other 
direction. Compared to fiber strands running in a straight line topology, which offers no 
other route for traffic in case of disconnection, this configuration offers more reliability 
and less intervention by the carrier in case of an emergency. Figure 2.8 below illustrates 
this concept. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Illustration of the Reliability of a Fiber SONET Ring  
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In this Figure, one set of fiber strands serves to send and receive while the other serves as a spare. If 
one set of fiber strands is disconnected or damaged due to any reasons, the traffic will be rerouted through 
the spare set in the other direction.  
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2.6.1 Telecom Company SONET Offerings – Higher Capacity at Lower Costs 
 
Many local telecommunications company are offering spare fiber-based SONET ring 
capacity to business customers. Offerings to interconnect T-1 and more importantly, T-3 
services to the SONET rings for extra reliability are not uncommon. These services target 
businesses and call centers such as airlines, financial services industry or emergency 
response services that demand both capacity and reliability. 
 
The speeds of SONET rings are increasing. This translates to less investment on overhead 
costs such as equipment and fiber strands and higher capacity to deliver vast amount of 
traffic. For example, Qwest Communications Corporation is installing an OC-192, fiber-
based SONET network to prepare for higher demands in motion, color and video 
applications that will drive the network capacity. Qwest is using Nortel SONET gear and 
multiplexing eight OC-192 streams onto fiber. This allows 80 megabits or one million 
calls on each fiber route. 
 
It is now easier for new carriers to reach OC-192 speeds due to technological advances. 
OC-192 demands a special fiber known as zero dispersion fiber – thinner and has fewer 
impurities than previous standard single mode fiber for carrier networks. This raises the 
quality and grade of fiber optic cabling in their cabling plants and reduces upgrade costs, 
as they do not need to upgrade older multiplexers and SONET devices.  
 
 
2.7 Location and Service Availability     
 
Today, businesses that are dependent on information technologies have a variety of 
options available to them, including the different types of advanced telecommunications 
services. Different technologies and services offer different comparative advantages for 
these businesses, especially in terms of their economics. For example, OC transport is a 
dedicated facility and is therefore, comparatively more expensive than frame relay for 
transmission of moderate amount of traffic. The choice of the types of services these 
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companies may subscribe to and the locations of these companies are crucial – they are 
partially dependent on the types of telecommunications services available in an area. 
These companies will employ careful planning and consultation on the availabilities of 
services in different areas of the country before making important corporate decisions 
with regard to their locations. This chapter highlighted some of the advanced 
telecommunications services and technologies these businesses may subscribe to. In the 
subsequent chapters, the patterns of deployment of these services across the United States 
will be discussed in greater details. 
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3  IMPACT OF THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT ON 
COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 
PROVISION  
 
 
3.1 Background and Aims of the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
 
The Telecommunication Act of 1996 is a landmark in the history of telecommunications 
in the United States and is central to many of the competition and regulatory policies 
discussed in this thesis. In general, the Act removes from each state the ability to approve 
and disapprove competition in local telecommunications, whereby state utilities are 
restricted from stopping entry of any qualified entrant into interstate or intrastate 
telecommunications service. An exception is the case of rural carriers where state public 
utilities commissions can decide if these rural companies have to provide unbundled 
network elements (UNEs).16 The Act sets the time frame and method whereby 
competition will be opened to a variety of suppliers. It outlines a procedure where local 
telephone companies can expand their operations into manufacturing and inter-LATA,17 
in-region and out-of-region, telecommunications. 
   
The Act was passed twelve years after the breakup of AT&T in 1984. It updates the 
Communications Act of 1934 and provides a national policy framework that relies on 
competition and market forces to advance the deployment of communications 
infrastructures throughout the country. The Act envisions competition in all 
telecommunications markets, both in the markets for the various elements that comprise 
the telecommunications network and for the final services the network creates. It touches 
                                                 
16 See Section 253 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and the order before the New Mexico State 
Corporation Commission in 1997 concerning the “Interconnection Contract between AT&T 
Communications of the Mountain States, Inc. and GTE Southwest, Inc.” (Docket Number 97-35-TC).  
 
17 LATA refers to Local Access Transport Area. At a divestiture in 1984, LATAs were set up as the areas 
in which Bell telephone companies were allowed to sell local telephone services. LATAs cover 
metropolitan statistical areas based on population sizes. The rules of divestiture decreed that long distance 
telephone companies like AT&T, Sprint and MCI were allowed to carry calls between LATAs but that a 
Bell telephone companies could only carry calls within a LATA.  
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almost every aspect of communications including: telephone services including local, 
long-distance, and wireless; free, over-the-air broadcast television; cable television; 
content and programming on television and computer networks including the Internet. 
 
In the case where there is only one company serving the market, a monopolistic situation 
may arise. Monopoly refers to a situation in which a business enterprise, in a particular 
market, is in a competition-free environment or enjoys overwhelming domination 
(compared to its competitors) in the setting and control of prices. Sometimes, there is an 
oligopoly, which refers to the dominance of the particular market by a few firms, which 
may engage in anti-competitive behaviors like predatory pricing or setting of prices 
above the competitive level. The "particular market” denotes the territory or scope in 
which business enterprises compete in marketing certain merchandise or services. The 
behaviors to maximize profits by the dominant firm or firms, which possess economic 
power in these situations may drive up prices above the competitive level and thus, 
increase the costs for the consumers and significantly reduce consumer welfare.  
 
Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), or "Baby Bells," and other local exchange 
carriers (LECs) currently provide most of the local phone service in the States. Drawing 
experience from the long distance market, which was gradually transformed from 
monopoly to an effectively competitive market, the 1996 Act attempts to correct 
imperfect competition in the market by fostering competitive local telecommunications 
markets that would eliminate the last bottleneck in telecommunications services – the 
"local loop". It is the connection from the home or business to the local switch, which has 
been dominated by local monopolies for nearly 100 years. The Act uses both structural 
and behavioral instruments to attain its objectives. It attempts to reduce regulatory 
barriers to entry and competition. It restricts artificial barriers to entry, which are set up 
by firms dominating the local exchange markets, in order to maximize the level of 
competition. It also makes compulsory the interconnection of telecommunications 
networks, unbundling, non-discrimination, and cost-based pricing of leased parts of the 
network, to ease competition by component, as well as by service. 
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The 1996 Act imposes conditions to make certain that de facto monopoly power is not 
exported to complementary or vertically-related markets. It therefore requires 
competition be established in local markets before the RBOCs are permitted in long 
distance service (other “non-RBOC” ILECs face no such restrictions). The Act 
recognizes the telecommunications network as a network of interconnected networks. 
Telecommunications providers are required to interconnect with entrants at any feasible 
point the entrant wishes. Most importantly, the Act requires that ILECs, predominantly 
the RBOCs to (i) lease parts of their network (unbundled network elements) to 
competitors “at cost”; (ii) provide at a wholesale discount to competitors any service the 
ILEC provides; and (iii) charge reciprocal rates in termination of calls to their network 
and to networks of local competitors. Moreover, the Act requires that ILECs that 
originated from the Bell System meet a number of requirements, including a public 
interest test – the inter-LATA services approval process under Section 271 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, before they may enter and compete in the long distance 
market. Thus, the Act provides some safeguards against the export of ILEC monopoly 
power to other parts of the network. These are shown in Table 3.1 below, which 
summarizes the key provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act relevant to the 
deployment of advanced telecommunications services.  
 
 
Table 3.1: Key Provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act Relevant to Deployment of ATS  
 
 
 
Section 251 
 
This section of the Act establishes a series of obligations applicable to telecommunications 
carriers. Some of them apply to all telecommunications carriers – local, long distance and others, 
while others apply only to providers of local telephone. The most detailed requirements apply to 
incumbent local telephone companies like the RBOCs. Those regulations concerning the 
incumbents consist of a collection of obligations designed to facilitate entry of competitors (new 
service providers) into local markets and increase their ability to compete with the incumbents. 
For example, these regulations include a requirement that incumbents make available parts of 
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their local networks to competing providers on just, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and 
conditions – procedures for implementation of these requirements are set forth in Section 252.       
 
Section 253 
 
This section generally preempts, with certain exceptions relating to universal service and other 
public policy objectives, any state or local statute or regulation that prohibits or has the effect of 
prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications 
service. 
 
Section 254 
 
This section promotes access to advanced telecommunications and information services in all 
regions of the United States. Universal service principles to be implemented by the FCC include 
ensuring: quality services at reasonable and affordable rates; access to advanced 
telecommunications services; access to such services in rural and high-cost regions; that all 
providers of telecommunications services make an equitable and non-discriminatory contribution 
to the preservation and advancement of universal service; that specific and predictable support 
mechanisms are in place to conduct such preservation and advancement; that there is access to 
advanced telecommunications services for schools, health care, and libraries; and that other 
principles that the joint federal-state board and the FCC may determine are necessary and 
appropriate for the protection of public interest are implemented.   
 
Section 259 
 
This section mandates that ILECs make available to any qualifying carrier any public switched 
telecommunications equipment or information as should be requested by the qualifying carrier, 
except in situations under which it would be economically unreasonable or against public interest 
for the ILECs to comply. It allows joint ownership and seeks to ensure that the ILEC is not 
treated as a “common carrier for hire” and that the carrier seeking the use of facilities will be 
allowed their use on just and reasonable terms. Section 259 also demands a transparent process – 
requiring the ILEC to report the terms and conditions of any facilities-sharing arrangements.  
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Section 271 
 
This section mandates that the FCC consult with the U.S. Department of Justice and relevant state 
commissions before ruling on a Bell company’s request to offer in-region inter-LATA services. 
Upon application by a Bell company, the FCC has 90 days to consider if the applicant has met a 
14-point competitive checklist of market-opening requirements contained in the section and if the 
company’s entry into the inter-LATA service market is in the interest of the public. This is 
commonly referred to as the 271 approval process or the inter-LATA approval process. 
 
Section 706   
 
This section attempts to promote the deployment of advanced telecommunications services in a 
reasonable and timely manner. It tries to carry this out by means of price cap regulation, 
regulatory forbearance, measures promoting competition in the local telecommunications market 
and other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment. This section also 
mandates the FCC to follow up with enquiries into the progress of deployment. Reports issued in 
August of 1999 and 2000 found deployment reasonable and timely based on subscription levels, 
service and technology options, and infrastructure investment at the time of the inquiries.18 The 
August 2000 report pointed out that advanced services may be unevenly distributed due to 
differences in wealth and population concentration across the United States.  
 
 
 
 
 
As the telecommunications policy framework is reframed to encourage competition 
through deregulation, the national policy must recognize that no market mechanism is 
perfect and that profound social and economic costs will be incurred when some 
individuals or groups of individuals are isolated from the information society due to 
                                                 
18 FCC, 1999, “Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment 
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: First Report”, CC Docket No. 98-146, 
FCC, Washington, D.C., August; and FCC, 2000, “Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps 
to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Second 
Report”, CC Docket No. 98-146, FCC, Washington, D.C., August 21. 
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prohibitively high cost of connection to the local telecommunications network 
infrastructure. There are many social and economic benefits from connecting all 
Americans. They include improved education, enhanced access to health care services 
and information, better jobs and living conditions. 
 
The U.S. Congress has concluded that consumers would benefit from the opening up of 
the telecommunications market, and the adoption of policies by policy makers to promote 
the deployment of advanced telecommunications services.19 While there are little 
disputes about these policy principles, different parties disagree on how to achieve these 
objectives. Since the implementation of the Act, several legal challenges on different 
fronts have been raised by the ILECs. This has resulted in the slow, and in some cases, 
the lack of implementation of the Act. This thesis hopes to provide insights on how 
appropriate use of public policy and regulatory instruments can be employed to achieve 
the objective of promoting deployment of advanced telecommunications services. 
  
 
3.2 The Lack of Success of the Telecommunications Act 
 
In the telecommunications industry, dramatic cost reduction has occurred in transmission, 
due to the use of fiber-optic technology; and in switching and information processing, 
due to the reductions of costs of integrated circuits and computers. Such cost reductions 
have enabled the provision of many data- and transmission- intensive services. Usually, 
such cost reduction would lead to entry of new competitors in the market and increased 
level of competition. However, entry of new competitors has been limited.  
 
At the end of 2001, competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) served only 10.2% of 
switched access lines and only 6.6% of the residential and small business market for local 
telecommunication services.20 The Telecommunication Act of 1996 has generated many 
                                                 
19 See Section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
 
20 Local Telephone Competition: Status as of December 31, 2001, Industry Analysis and Technology 
Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, July 2002, Tables 1 and 2. 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/lcom0702.pdf 
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unintended consequences and has had little success in spurring local competition, driving 
down costs and increasing consumer welfare. Instead, the laws initiated a frenzy of 
mergers and acquisitions. Incumbent telecommunications companies acquired other firms 
and new services, re-branded them, tapped into new markets and won broader customer 
base.  
 
Although it is the Congress’ intention to promote competition in the telecommunications 
market and advanced services, these goals may be incompatible. The network elements 
owned by the ILECs have to be constantly maintained and upgraded for new capabilities 
and services to be available. This requires significant financial and time investment on 
the part of the incumbents. To innovate and develop such new facilities only to sell their 
network elements away at low UNE cost would create serious disincentives for these 
incumbents. Furthermore, the ILECs may be unwilling to bear the high risk associated 
with investment of such magnitude if they cannot fully benefit from it.  
 
In the increasingly deregulated markets, telecommunications service providers, especially 
the ILECs, will attempt to introduce new and innovative products and services unless the 
regulatory environment is unsuitable for such implementation. In general, incompatibility 
of goals in the promotion of competition and advanced telecommunications services in 
the local markets may jeopardize the intended goals of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act.  
  
The 1996 Telecommunications Act was aimed at opening up the market, promoting 
competition and advancing public interest, as laid out in Table 3.1. It will be a significant 
failure on the part of the U.S. political, legal and regulatory systems if interests and 
welfare of the public cannot be advanced. In the following chapters, this thesis will go on 
to investigate the effect of several key provisions of the 1996 Act on the deployment of 
advanced telecommunications services. 
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4  METRICS AND DATA SOURCES 
 
 
Innovation is defined as “the practical use of an invention to produce new products or 
services, to improve existing ones, or to improve the way in which they are produced or 
distributed. Innovations include technologically improved products or processes, where 
processes may involve changes in equipment, human resources, or working methods.”21  
 
Progress in developing a theoretical understanding of innovation has been hindered by 
difficulties in measuring its outputs as determinants of industrial performance and 
economic growth. One cannot produce useful and insightful results unless one has good 
data.  
 
In order to address questions such as i) the impact of competition on the availability of 
advanced telecommunications services ; and ii) how regulation affects the behavior of the 
local exchange companies, an extensive micro data set has been collected and compiled 
over a period of one and half years. Naturally, the data set draws from different sources – 
from government surveys and the U.S. census to university publications and private 
companies information – in an attempt to make the regression analyses as comprehensive 
as possible. In order to provide useful insights to the aforementioned policy questions, the 
rich data set incorporates a tremendous amount of detail about the nature of 
telecommunications markets throughout the United States.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed description and clarification over the 
complexity of various metrics and variables used for this research. It will also highlight 
the importance and validity of these data sets and their sources while discussing some of 
their limitations. 
                                                 
21 Cooper, Ronald, and Stephen Merrill (eds) (1997), Industrial Research and Innovation Indicators: 
Report of Workshop, Washington, D.C., National Academy Press 
 http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309059941/html/R1.html 
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 4.1 Choice of Metrics for Study 
 
The comprehensive data set has been designed and constructed to allow for the 
econometric analysis and verification of these two main hypotheses: i) competition has a 
positive impact on the availability of advanced telecommunications services; ii) 
regulation affects behaviors of the firms to deploy advanced telecommunications 
services. The data allows the investigation of how the availability of advanced 
telecommunications services, such as packet switching, DS technologies and SONET – 
OC transport, are affected by such factors as i) local competition data; ii) economic and 
demographic data by wire center; iii) business data by wire center, including ownership 
of wire centers, number and characteristics of business establishments; and iv) regulatory 
environments in each state.  
 
 
4.2 Categories of Metrics 
4.2.1 Advanced Telecommunications Services Availability 
4.2.1.1 Approach and Data Source  
 
Various advanced telecommunications services availabilities, such as those described in 
Chapter 2 have been incorporated into the data set. Specifically, they are packet 
switching, different levels of DS technologies and SONET – OC transport by wire 
center22 for years 1994-2001.  
 
It is important to describe how this set of data is obtained and aggregated because it 
affects the validity of the regression analyses. Firstly, the availabilities of the different 
types of ATS were obtained from the National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc. 
(NECA)23 tariff data (2001) using the office type codes contained in it. Next, information 
                                                 
22 Wire centers typically house switches for the ILECs and CLECs.   
 
23 National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc. (NECA) is founded in October 1983 and is mandated by the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC was responding to the rapid and unprecedented 
changes occurring because of the divestiture by AT&T of its Bell Operating Companies and its own efforts 
to promote long distance competition. The breakup was the result of an antitrust settlement made between 
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on the economic characteristics of the territory served by a wire center was needed. The 
economic characteristics of a wire center were obtained by doing an overlay of the 
service territory of the wire centers over the zip code boundaries. A wire center consists 
of one or more of the areas designated by a particular zip code (or a percentage of some 
zip code areas), while a zip code area is made up of a few census blocks. The business 
and household census and various other sources, classified by zip codes, were also used 
to determine the economic characteristics of the wire centers.   
     
After collection and aggregation of data, if the wire center, for example, has the 
capability of OC, the corresponding space under that particular wire center in the data set 
will indicate a one and if such capability does not exist, it will indicate a zero. The 
primary software used for data entry and compilation is Microsoft Access. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1 on the next page.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
AT&T and the federal government in the name of fostering competition in the U.S. telecommunications 
market. The FCC needed NECA to serve as an intra-industry body to implement key portions of its access 
charge plan. NECA is also responsible for the preparation of cost and demand forecasts for pooling 
companies and filing and defense of tariffs reflecting pool revenue requirements, under the FCC's access 
charge rules. In addition to these access tariff and pooling functions, NECA also acts, in accordance with 
FCC rules, as administrator of the FCC's interstate Telecommunications Relay Services Fund. 
 
 50 
Figure 4.1: Sample of Data Segment on Wire Center and Advanced Telecommunications Services 
Availability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Limitations 
 
One limitation to the NECA tariff 4 data is the question of self-reporting of data. The 
ILECs themselves determine how to classify what services are and are not available. 
There is no independent effort by a neutral third party to verify the accuracy and validity 
of the self-reported data. However, it is important to note that these companies have an 
incentive to self-report accurately because customers rely heavily on the tariff data to find 
out services and product availabilities and locations. 
 
Nevertheless, inaccuracy in the indication of capability in each wire center may exist. For 
example, in the state of Connecticut, most of the DS and OC capabilities in the wire 
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centers currently reflect a “one” – indicating the availability of those services. This is 
particularly high considering the status of other neighboring New England states. Very 
recent code entries changes occurred in Connecticut. They were primarily updates for DS 
and OC functionalities by Southern New England Telephone (SNET) (see also Footnote 
36) and these dramatically raised the number of wire centers that were DS and OC 
capable. This revealed the possibility that telecommunications service providers may not 
tariff services like DS and OC even if such capabilities exist in their wire centers. A LEC 
may not tariff a service because it could then charge higher special service charges to 
customers.  This situation may also exist in the NECA data for other states. The recent 
tariff modifications made in Connecticut highlights that this analysis focuses on services 
offered to customers, not the physical capabilities of a network. 
 
 
4.2.2 Local Competition Data  
4.2.2.1 Approach and Data Source 
 
An ILEC may be induced to introduce newer and more advanced services at a faster pace 
if it observes that its competitors are operating in the same region. If it does not offer 
these services, its business customers have great tendency and motivation to switch to its 
competitors if such services are required. 
 
In order to examine how competitive entries into the market affect the deployment of 
advanced telecommunications services, the number of wire centers served by CLECs that 
are located within 3, 5, 7 or 10 mile radius24 of each wire center served by ILECs in 2001 
and 2002 was ascertained.  
 
                                                 
24 The number of wire centers served by CLECs that are located within 1 mile radius of each wire center 
served by ILECs in 2001 and 2002 was also computed but it was found that the general lack of presence of 
competitors within that distance across the states made it insignificant for regression analysis. That is, due 
to the lack of variation in the explanatory variable, it was difficult to obtain a statistically significant 
estimate of the coefficient on the explanatory variable. 
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To achieve this aim, a C++ program was written to search and determine the number of 
wire centers served by competitive providers – CAPs or CLECs, located within the 
specified mile radius of wire centers served by an incumbent – independent telephone 
companies (ICOs)25 and Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) or ILECs. The 
program made use of the horizontal and vertical coordinates of each wire center, provided 
by the Local Exchange Routing Guide (LERG)26 database and used Pythagoras theorem 
to determine the specified radius (3, 5, 7 or 10 miles) from each ILEC wire center. The 
vertical and horizontal coordinates are converted to miles based on the "Donald Elliptic 
Projection", shown in Figure 4.2 below. The same process is also highlighted in NECA 
Tariff 4 report – Wire Center and Interconnection Information: Mileage Measurement, 
issued on August 17, 1999, by the director of Access Tariffs and Access Planning.   
 
Figure 4.2: Conversion of Vertical and Horizontal Coordinates to Miles Based on Donald Elliptic 
Projection (Source: Peter H. Dana, Department of Geography, University of Colorado at Boulder)  
 
  
                                                 
25 Independent Telephone Company (ICO) refers to the initial telephone company that provides wireline 
local exchange service in a non-RBOC geographical area. ICOs and RBOCs are often referred to as the 
incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC). 
 
26 The Local Exchange Routing Guide (LERG) is a comprehensive routing database produced by 
Telcordia™ Routing Administration (TRA). The data supports the current local exchange network 
configuration within the North American Numbering Plan (NANP) and identifies reported planned changes 
in the network. The LERG is primarily designed to be used for 1) routing of inter-LATA calls by inter-
exchange carriers; 2) providing information on the local environment for the numerous carriers involved in 
the local arena; and 3) any other company needing information about the network, numbering, and other 
data in the product. 
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The competition data derived from the program is then entered and compiled into the data 
set. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3 below.   
  
Figure 4.3: Sample of Data Segment on Competition Variables (from LERG), Other Business and 
Regulatory Variables and Their Abbreviations  
 
 
 
 
In order to increase statistical significance and reduce statistical variation, a large number 
of observations (20,755) is considered in my analysis. There is significant presence of 
competitors in the same region as the incumbents as indicated by the means. These are 
shown in Table 4.1 on the next page, which provides a summary of the number of 
observations, the mean number of competitor wire centers located within 3, 5, 7 or 10 
mile radius of an incumbent’s wire center and their standard deviations. We postulate that 
the presence of a CLEC in close proximity would have a positive impact on an ILEC’s 
tariff offering of advanced telecommunications services. 
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Table 4.1: Illustration of Competition Variables - CLECs’ Point of Presence in Specified Number of 
Miles for ILECs (2001)  
 
 
 
 
4.2.2.2 Limitations 
 
There are certain limitations in this model. Although carefully conceived to detect 
interesting competition data variations, the distances of 3, 5, 7 and 10 miles are set 
arbitrarily. A challenge in future research is to find the critical distance in which the 
impact of competition on deployment of ATS will yield the most significant effect.  
 
 
4.2.3 Economic and Demographic Data  
4.2.3.1 Approach and Data Source 
 
Although the main focus of this study is the deployment of services used by businesses, 
the economic and demographic characteristics of households, together with the number of 
people employed within the boundaries of the wire center, provide a good proxy for the 
size of the market. 
 
The economic and demographic data by wire center are extracted from the 1990 census 
from the United States Census Bureau, in the United States Department of Commerce.27 
                                                 
27 The business and household census data are available at the zip code level of observation.  The territory 
of a zip code may be in one or more wire center boundaries.  Data that provide geo-coded wire center 
boundary information are available.  See, for example, 
http://www.geographic.com/home/prodservdisplay.cfm?ProdId=23&IndID=16 and 
http://www.mapinfo.com/community/free/library/telecom_catalog02.pdf (page 5 of 24).   
This boundary data can be overlaid onto the census data in order to obtain a matching between the zip 
codes and wire center boundaries. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
3 miles 20,755 1.63 5.15 0 147
5 miles 20,755 1.63 8.02 0 160
7 miles 20,755 2.57 10.72 0 188
10 miles 20,755 4.26 15.17 0 214
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They are comprehensive and include variables such as total population; land area (in 
square miles); persons per square mile; total male and female population; persons living 
in rural area; persons living on farms, in family or alone; racial and ethnic breakdowns (in 
terms of numbers and percentages); percentages of population in each age group; total 
households; number and percentage of persons in households comprising of different 
numbers of family members; detailed household status (married couples, single parent 
households, number of children etc.); detailed household and family income status and 
income ranges; different levels of poverty; levels of education in each family and 
household by number and percentages; employment status; total number of employees; 
types of job functions in the population; status of housing and details of the buildings; 
values of housing and rent, among other variables. Some of these variables and their 
abbreviations are illustrated in Figure 4.4 on the next page.         
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Figure 4.4: Sample of Data Segment on Economic and Demographic Variables and Their 
Abbreviations from the United States Census (1990)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3.2 Limitations 
 
For the purpose of this study, the 1990 Census provides a good source of reference. This 
is because the 2000 Census has only been released recently, and the ILECs most probably 
have not referred to it before making their decisions to deploy ATS by May 2001 (as 
reflected in the data set) – they have compared different markets based on the 1990 
Census. 
  
In future studies, however, the coverage and accuracy of the different variables in the 
1990 Census can be further improved, for example, by reducing the differential 
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undercounts of certain population groups. One possibility is to incorporate the 2000 
Census into the data set to reflect improvement in coverage.28  
 
 
4.2.4 Business Data  
4.2.4.1 Approach and Data Source 
 
The business data by wire center is extracted and compiled from the “ZIP Code Business 
Patterns” series CDs, published by the U.S. Census Bureau, Economics and Statistics 
Administration under the U.S. Department of Commerce.29 The latest issue, “ZIP Code 
Business Patterns 1999”, published in November 2002, was also taken into account in the 
data set. The business data is comprehensive – it includes total number of business 
establishment; total number of employees and payroll; total number of small (1-19 
employees), medium (20-99 employees) and large firms (more than 100 employees); and 
types of business by Standard Industrial Code (SIC).  
 
In this analysis, particular focus is placed on industries which tend to make more 
intensive use of advanced telecommunications services, such as finance and insurance 
(SIC: 52); and professional, scientific and technical services (SIC: 54) As discussed in 
Section 4.2.3.1, the total number of employees and the total number of households are 
good predictors of the size of a wire center and the first set of regressions included only 
those explanatory variables. However, the ILECs and CLECs may target deployment of 
advanced services in areas that are heavy users of communications services. Therefore, 
subsequent set of regressions control for the types of industries, particularly for SIC 52 
and 54, in each wire center except when the Wald test indicates that the joint impacts of 
the SIC coefficients are zero (see Section 5.3.3.1).    
 
                                                 
28 See announcement from the US Commerce Department's Census Bureau on February 14, 2001 - 
preliminary estimates showed an apparent improvement in the coverage of Census 2000 over 1990, 
including reductions in the differential undercounts of certain population groups. 
 
29 See Footnote 26 for more details on wire center boundary overlay. 
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4.2.4.2 Limitations 
 
As there is no publicly available information at the zip code level on the number of 
employees by Standard Industrial Code and information is restricted to the total number 
of small, medium or large establishments, this information is used in the regression 
analysis. It is not appropriate to sum the number of establishments of small, medium and 
large firms because the communications requirements of a large firm are very different 
from that of a small firm. Consequently, regressions were carried out using only the 
number of large firms by industrial codes.  
 
 
4.2.5 Regulatory Environments 
4.2.5.1 Approach and Data Source 
 
To control for the regulatory regimes in each state, data was compiled based on the state 
surveys, regulatory publications and other sources.    
  
Initially, regulation environments were broadly classified into five main categories: rate-
of-return (ROR), price cap, price cap with interim rate freeze, rate freeze and non-
indexed caps, and deregulation, based on information from table - “Forms of Regulation 
for Basic Services in the U.S. States” (2000)30 and a study by Abel and Clements (1998) 
from the National Regulatory Research Institute (NRRI).31 However, this approach has 
not sufficiently address the plethora of regulatory regimes for individual 
telecommunications service providers in each state. A detailed survey study was then 
conducted and surveys were sent to government agencies, mostly public service 
commissions, in all fifty states. The survey asked each state to indicate the exact forms of 
                                                 
30 Source: State Telephone Regulation Report White Paper, 18 (20-22) (October 2000). 
 
31 Abel, Jaison R., and Michael E. Clements (1998), A Time Series and Cross-sectional Classification of 
State Regulatory Policy Adopted for Local Exchange Carriers: Divestiture to Present (1984-1998), 
National Regulatory Research Institute. 
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regulation for individual telecommunications service providers, based on the indices 
created from a to k: from different forms of rate-of-return (ROR), rate case moratoria, 
rate-of-return incentive schemes, indexed and non-indexed price cap schemes, rate 
freezes, pricing flexibility for competitive services schemes, access pricing, to 
deregulation. The survey further requested each state to indicate business (basic and other 
services), residential (basic and other services) and advanced telecommunications access 
for every company in the state. This created a comprehensive and novel data set that 
gives us an insight into the complex regulatory environments in every state in U.S. from 
years 1994 to 2002. For the purpose of this thesis, I have controlled for the forms of 
federal regulation – price cap versus rate-of-return regulation. 
 
Furthermore, I gathered information from the Rural Utilities Services (RUS) Borrower 
list for year ending in 2001.32 It includes important information such as borrower 
identification and names of telecommunications companies that had received RUS 
support. We postulate that, all else equal, companies receiving RUS support will more 
likely deploy advanced telecommunications services.     
 
Also, data collected from the FCC was used to determine whether the 
telecommunications carriers were classified as rural by FCC33 and whether they were 
under price cap or ratebase rate-of-return regulations. The natures of the carriers were 
indicated – rural or non-rural, together with other criteria that were incorporated to make 
the data set as complete and up-to-date as possible. The FCC rural classification (nature 
of carriers) gives an indication whether the carrier is classified as rural or non-rural 
carrier. We postulate that the presence of rural classification will adversely affect the 
deployment of advanced telecommunications services. Classification of firms under 
federal price cap regulation or ratebase rate-of-return regulation was also determined 
using the regulatory data collected. We postulate that the presence of federal price cap 
                                                 
32 The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural Utilities Service (RUS) aims to help rural 
utilities expand and keep their technology up to date, and to help establish new and vital services such as 
distance learning and telemedicine through partnerships with rural cooperatives, nonprofit associations, 
public bodies, and for-profit utilities. RUS also grants loans to telecommunications companies to achieve 
these objectives. 
 
33 Information obtained from Interstate Regulatory Status (4th quarter 2002). 
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regulation will increase the likelihood that ATS is available more than the presence of 
rate-based regulation, based on the work of Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller (1995) who 
found that federal price cap regulation would have a positive impact. However, our 
regression analyses did not confirm this hypothesis (Section 5.3.3.2). Figure 4.3 in 
Section 4.2.2.1 illustrated some of these variables.      
 
The Bell Operating Companies (BOC) must file applications with the FCC on a state-by-
state basis in order to provide in-region inter-LATA services under Section 271 of the 
Communications Act of 1934. This is known as the 271 approval process or inter-LATA 
approval process, which has a significant impact on the development of competition. In 
order to control for 271 activities, the dataset also included the date that an RBOC 
receives 271 approvals from the FCC.34 The inter-LATA approval process is a test given 
to the RBOCs to justify if their entry into the inter-LATA service market is in the interest 
of the public. We postulate that once the RBOCs have passed the inter-LATA approval 
hurdle, the deployment of advanced telecommunications services will be more likely and 
will be accelerated.   
 
In addition, the database includes, among other fields, average monthly loop rates,35 
monthly total loop costs,36 and ratio of loop rate to loop cost. The latter gives the ratio of 
unbundled network elements prices to their embedded costs for each RBOC in a state. 
The same ratio is used for all ILECs in a state (for example, in Texas, information is 
available only for UNE loop to embedded cost loop ratio for SBC, among the various 
companies. This ratio is applied to all ILECs in Texas under the assumption that the ratio 
is a good proxy for the state regulatory climate for all companies). This ratio serves as a 
good measurement of how friendly the regulatory regime in the particular state is to the 
RBOCs in terms of the unbundling and resale mandate according to Section 251(c) of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act. The higher the ratio, the more friendly the regulatory 
                                                 
34 See http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-region_applications/ 
 
35 Data source: Gregg, Billy J., Survey of Unbundled Network Element Prices in the United States (updated 
January 1, 2002). 
 
36 These were calculated from the NECA data as of December 31, 2000 on the basis of total Loops. 
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environment is to the RBOCs and the reverse is true. We postulate that when the ratio is 
high, RBOCs are more likely to invest and deploy advanced telecommunications services 
since the possibility of recouping their investment is higher. More explanation is 
provided in the later sections of this thesis (Sections 5.3.3.4 and 6.1.1). Figure 4.3 in 
Section 4.2.2.1 illustrated some of these variables.  
 
 
4.2.5.2 Limitations  
   
Future research can explore the intricate relationships between ATS availabilities and 
each specific form of regulation by refining and redesigning current econometric analysis 
procedures.      
 
In addition, in the data collection process, some assumptions were made about 271 
approvals. For example, for GTE's properties in Pennsylvania, an assumption that the 
area was unaffected by the decision to grant 271 approval to the area served by the 
former BOC was made. We assumed that the 271 approval for Bell Atlantic Pennsylvania 
would have no impact on the former GTE Pennsylvania territory, which is also part of 
Verizon. 
 
Other limitations exist in the data sets, despite their comprehensive details. In the RUS 
borrower data, even if the company which qualifies as a borrower can be identified, little 
or no information is included on the degree which the RUS company is utilizing the 
available funds. This could create possible discrepancy in the analysis when there are 
actually different degrees of usage of funds. 
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5 ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF 
LOCAL COMPETITION AND REGULATION  
 
 
The establishment of robust competition among multiple telecommunications providers, 
including the providers of advanced telecommunications services, has always been the 
goal of many regulatory officials and is a fundamental objective of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Under the present regulatory regime, two main paths 
toward competition are conceived: i) unbundling and resale; and ii) facilities-based 
competition. Unbundling of local loops and other network elements and resale are aimed 
at stimulating competition in the short-run and easing the cost of entry, while facilities-
based competition involves new market entrants utilizing their own equipment and 
physical network to compete. With unbundling, it is harder for a CLEC to offer new 
services since it has to rely on the ILEC’s network. Many policy makers, economists and 
consumer advocates believe that only with facilities-based entry, will there be 
competition in quality and diversity of services and not just on price (see Section 6.1).  
 
There are concerns that companies facing insufficient competition or less than optimal 
regulatory regimes will compromise on the deployment of advanced telecommunications 
services – in terms of availability, level of services and quality. The report prepared by 
OECD on “The Development of Broadband Access in OECD Countries”  (2001) showed 
that there were greater availability of advanced telecommunications services in the 
markets that were more competitive and found that “the most fundamental policy 
available to OECD governments to boost broadband access is infrastructure 
competition.” Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller (1995) also found that less than optimal 
regulation may impede investments.  
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5.1 Pertinent Research Questions 
 
The database constructed has provided the vehicle to address pertinent research questions 
regarding the impact of local competition and regulation on availabilities of ATS to 
businesses. In this thesis, the following questions are discussed: i) how competitive entry 
into the market affects ATS deployment decisions; ii) how corporate ownership (RBOCs, 
medium and small) affects ATS deployment; iii) how forms of regulation, for example, 
price caps versus rate base rate of return and unbundled network element (UNE) prices, 
affect the deployment of ATS; iv) how 271 approval process affects ATS deployment 
decisions. This set of questions is by no means exhaustive and potential future research 
can be carried out by expanding on this data set through addition of new variables (refer 
to Section 6.4 for discussion on possible future research).   
 
 
5.2 Statistical Models 
5.2.1 Qualitative Response Regression Model 
 
The statistical model that will be used primarily for this analysis is the qualitative 
response regression model. The qualitative or discrete regression model is defined as 
those models in which the response variables (or dependent variables) assume discrete 
values. In our case, the response variable is binary. There are only two possible outcomes 
for the response variables – dummy variables coded 0 or 1 – a firm either does or does 
not offer an advanced telecommunications service such as packet switching, DS or OC. 
In the qualitative response models, both the logistic distribution and cumulative normal 
distribution curve are commonly used. They are referred to as logit and probit 
respectively.   
 
In the following sections, the basic linear probability model – using the method of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) will first be introduced. Then, it is compared to the logit and 
probit models. Some potential problems with the former model in relation to the latter 
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two models will be discussed. The description of the models in this section will conclude 
with the most appropriate choice of models – the logit and probit regression models.  
   
 
5.2.2 Problems with Linear Probability Model   
 
Historically, some statisticians have applied the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation on linear probability models. When using the method of least squares in 
estimating regression parameters, the values of the population regression coefficients (0, 
β1, …, βk) are usually unknown and can only be obtained through estimation from a 
sample of data points. In the case of simple linear regression, for example, the method of 
least squares is employed to estimate such regression coefficients from the sample. In 
order to find the least squares estimators of β0, β1, …, βk, the coefficients b0, b1, …, bk 
that minimize the sum of squared differences between the observed values of y and the 
values of y predicted by b0 + b1x1 + … + bkxk have to be determined first. Therefore, we 
minimize the equation:  
 
∑[y - (b0 + b1x1 + … + bkxk)]2             [5.1] 
 
The sample regression equation obtained by the method of least squares can be written as  
 
ŷ = b0 + b1x1 + … + bkxk   + e   [5.2]  
 
where i) ŷ is the predicted value of y, or the estimated probability (has value of 1 if event 
happens, has value of 0 if event does not happen); ii) b0 is the coefficient on the constant 
term; iii) b1, b2, …, bk are the coefficients on the iv) independent variables x1, x2, …, xk; 
and v) e is the error term. 
However, potential problems may exist in the predicted probability from such model. 
Whereas the OLS regression uses normal probability theory, logistic regression uses 
binomial probability theory. There are 3 main problems associated with the use of the 
linear probability model: 
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1) The error terms are heteroskedastic, which occurs when the variance of the 
dependent variable is different with different values of the independent variables: 
var(e) = p(1-p), where p is the probability that event =1. Since p depends on x, the 
assumption in “classical regression” that the error term does not depend on x1, x2, 
…, xk is violated. 
2) The error term, e is not normally distributed because p takes on only two values – 
this violates another "classical regression” assumption.  
3) The predicted probability ŷ can be greater than 1 or less than 0, which may give 
rise to potential problems if the predicted values are used in a subsequent analysis. 
Attempt to overcome such problems by setting probabilities that are greater than 1 
to be equal to 1 and probabilities that are less than 0 to be equal to 0 can be falsely 
interpreted that a high probability of the event (nonevent) occurring is certain.  
The fundamental concern about the linear probability model is that it is not logically very 
attractive because it assumes the expected value of the dependent variable “increases 
linearly with x (the independent variable), that is, the marginal or incremental effect of x 
remains constant throughout… This seems patently unrealistic. In reality, one would 
expect the pi is nonlinearly related to xi.”
37 In our regression analysis, we need a function 
such as the cumulative distribution function of a random variable, where outcomes lie 
between 0 and 1 and the response process is not linear but an S curve shape, which is 
often observed in technology adoption curves (Geroski, 2000).38 The logit and probit 
models have these properties.39 
 
 
                                                 
37 Guarati, Damodar N. (2003), Basic Econometric, Fourth Edition, McGraw Hill, New York, p. 593. 
 
38 For a review of literature on technology diffusion models, refer to, for example, Geroski, Paul A. (2000), 
Models of Technology Diffusion, Research Policy, 29, p. 603-625 
 
39 An extended discussion is found in, for example, Pampel, Fred C. (2000: 54-68). 
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5.2.3 Logit and Probit Models 
 
The logit and probit models solve these problems. In the logit model:  
 
ln [p/(1-p)] = b0 + b1x1 + e    [5.3] 
Alternatively, equation [5.3] can be written as: 
[p/(1-p)] = eb0 eb1 ex1 ee   [5.4] 
where i) ln is the natural logarithm, logexp, where exp = 2.71828…; ii) p is the probability 
that the event Y occurs, p(Y=1); iii) p/(1-p) is the “odds ratio”; iv) ln[p/(1-p)] is the log 
odds ratio, or logit; v) all other components of the model are the same as those described 
following equation [5.2].   
The logistic distribution constrains the estimated probabilities to lie between 0 and 1. For 
example, the estimated probability is:  
p = [exp(b0 + b1x1)]/[1 + exp(b0 + b1x1)]  [5.5] 
Alternatively, equation [5.5] can be written as:  
p = 1/[1 + exp(-b0 - b1x1)]    [5.6] 
This implies that i) if b0 + b1x1= 0, then p = 0.5; ii) as the term (b0 + b1x1) increases to 
infinity, p approaches 1; iii) as (b0 + b1x1) decreases to 0, p approaches 0.  
 
The logistic regression model is simply a non-linear transformation of the linear 
regression model. It makes use of the logistic distribution, which is a S-shaped 
distribution function similar to the standard cumulative normal distribution used by the 
probit regression model. In general, the cumulative normal distribution and the logistic 
distribution are very close to each other, except at the tails. They yield very similar 
results unless a huge number of observations is used. Usually, the two estimations cannot 
be compared directly. As the logistic distribution has a variation of π2/3, the results from 
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the logit has to be multiplied by √3/π2 to be comparable to the estimation from the probit 
model.40  
 
A graphical comparison of the linear probability regression model and the logistic 
regression model is illustrated in Figure 5.1 below. The graph shows how with logit, 
unlike the linear probability model, ŷ falls between 0 and 1 and adopts an S-shape.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Comparison of Linear Probability Regression Model and Logistic Regression Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 More details about these models can be found in econometric textbooks such as Basic Econometric, by 
Guarati, Damodar N. (2003). 
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5.2.4 Components of the Logit and Probit Regression Output Tables  
 
The level of significance gives the precision with which the confidence intervals of the 
regression estimates are likely to contain the true regression parameters. The standard 
used for the level of significance in this statistical analysis is 5% (unless otherwise 
indicated).  
 
The regression output tables for logit and probit will typically consist of the following 
information: 
  
1) Chi-square (χ2): also known as the model likelihood ratio (LR): 
  
          LR(i) = -2[LL(b0) - LL(b0,b1)]   [5.7] 
 
The model LR statistic follows a χ2 distribution with i degrees of freedom, where i 
is the number of independent variables. LL refers to the log of the likelihood 
function (L). The "unconstrained model", LL(b0,b1), is the log-likelihood function 
evaluated with all independent variables included and the "constrained model" is 
the log-likelihood function evaluated with only the constant included, LL(b0). The 
Chi-square statistic determines if the overall model is statistically significant.       
 
2) R2: in OLS, the R2 (coefficient of determination) denotes the proportion of the 
variance in the dependent variable (response variable) explained by the variance 
in the independent variables (predictor variable or explanatory variable), and lies 
between 0 and 1. Although there is no equivalent measure in logistic regression, 
there are several pseudo R2 statistics. One of them is the McFadden’s R2 statistic, 
or the likelihood ratio index (LRI):    
McFadden's-R2 = 1 - [LL(b0,b1)/LL(b0)]  
    = 1 - [-2LL(b0,b1)/-2LL(b0)]    [5.8] 
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where R2 is a scalar measure between 0 to 1 like the R2 in the linear probability 
model although pseudo R2 is usually much less than that in the linear probability 
model - it is very difficult to "maximize the R2" in logistic regression as the LRI 
depends on the ratio of the beginning and ending log-likelihood functions. The 
pseudo R2 in logit and probit models are best used to compare different 
specifications of the same model instead of models with different data sets. 
 
3) Coefficient:41 instead of the slope coefficient (b1) being the rate of change in the 
dependent variable (y) as the independent variable (x) changes in OLS, the slope 
coefficient here represents the rate of change in “log odds” as x changes. A more 
intuitive “marginal effect” of a continuous independent variable on the probability 
can be calculated:  dp/db1= f(b1x)b1 where f(.) is the density function of the 
cumulative probability distribution function F(b1x), which ranges from 0 to 1. The 
marginal effects depend on the values of the independent variables - it is useful to 
evaluate the marginal effects at the means of the independent variables. 
 
4) Standard Error of Coefficient: standard error of the estimated coefficients. This 
parameter provides a measure of the dispersion of the estimates. 
 
5) T-Statistic (T): enables the testing of the null hypothesis of a coefficient (or the 
hypothesis of the coefficient being 0) at the specified level of statistical 
significance. In general, for large samples, a standard 5% significance level and a 
one-tailed test, when the absolute value of the t value is observed to be 1.975 or 
greater, it would allow the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
 
6) Z-Statistic (Z): similar to T, except it is used only when the population standard 
deviation, σ, is known or when n is large (since T converges on Z 
asymptotically). 
                                                 
41 The computation of the regression coefficients is usually quite complex and their values are cumbersome 
without using matrix notation – such calculations of the estimated regression coefficients are generally 
done using statistical software such as Stata or SAS. 
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7) P-value (Probability value): this value gives the exact significance level 
associated with each coefficient. When the P-value is less than or equal to 5% (or 
0.05), the coefficient is significant at the 5% significance level (take note to 
distinguish between a one and two-tailed test). The P-value denotes the likelihood 
that t value is obtained due to random effects. When the reported P-values are 
essentially 0%, it indicates that the observed relationship is very unlikely caused 
by random events and the relationship is statistically significant.  
 
In summary, the logit or probit models are used because the adoption process is not linear 
and because of the 3 main statistical concerns about the linear probability model, 
identified in Section 5.2.2. Standard hypothesis testing can still be carried out despite the 
use of logit or probit. Such procedures would enable the testing of overall fit of the 
model, using Chi-square and of individual coefficients, using Z or T test. A more 
sophisticated model specifically tailored to take into account of the issue of endogenous 
competition variable – the bivariate probit model, which estimates maximum-likelihood 
two-equation probit models will be presented and explained in Section 5.3.2.1. 
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5.3 Econometric Analyses and Findings 
 
Econometrics begins with a theory. I started the econometric analysis with a simple 
model – we postulate the availability of service is in part a positive function of the size of 
the market. The size of the market can be estimated by the following explanatory 
variables: i) total number of employees in all business establishments located in each 
wire center; and ii) total number of households in each wire center in the U.S.     
  
To verify this hypothesis, testing using actual line counts for wire centers was conducted. 
The result was very robust – more than 80% of the variations in the number of access 
lines could be accounted for by just using the number of households and the number of 
employees as explanatory variables (see adjusted R2 in Table 5.1 below). This calculation 
provided validation to the map overlay techniques employed in this research (as 
explained in Section 4.2.1.1) – if the overlays were not accurately done, the regression 
analysis would not have produced such robust results (i.e. the simple model using actual 
wire center line counts could not have explained up to 90% of the variations in actual line 
counts). Table 5.1 below illustrates this test.                    
 
Table 5.1: Verification of Robustness of Econometric Model Using Line Counts     
 
 
 
      Source |     SS         df       MS              Number of obs =    1144 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,  1141) = 3664.45 
       Model |  2.9280e+11     2  1.4640e+11           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4.5585e+10  1141  39951711.6           R-squared     =  0.8653 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8651 
       Total |  3.3839e+11  1143   296051630           Root MSE      =  6320.7 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Loops in     |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
Service      | 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 # Employees |   .5286943   .0222053    23.81   0.000     .4851266    .5722621 
 # Households|    .974436   .0306513    31.79   0.000     .9142967    1.034575 
       cons  |   1952.739   229.8328     8.50   0.000     1501.797    2403.682 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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5.3.1 General Observations 
 
From the data set, we observed an increasing trend in deployment across all levels of 
advanced telecommunications services in the United States over the past few years (see 
Figure 5.2 below).  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Deployment of ATS in the United States 
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From the results of econometric regression analyses (Section 5.3.4), the first observation 
shows that the deployment of advanced telecommunications services (packet switching, 
DS and OC) are positively correlated to i) total number of employees in all business 
establishments located in each wire center and ii) total number of households in each wire 
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center in the U.S. In other words, the number of employees and the size of the household 
population increase the likelihood of ATS being available. 
 
In this set of regression analyses, the dependent variable is the availability of ATS. The 
independent (right-hand side) variables include items (i) and (ii) above. We have similar 
results for packet switching, OC, DS services for 2001. In this set of regression analyses, 
the relevant parameters (as mentioned in Section 5.2.4) indicate that the results are 
statistically significant. Throughout the rest of the regression analyses, statistically 
significant results are consistently obtained. 
 
 
5.3.2 Impact of Local Competition 
5.3.2.1 Bivariate Probit Model and Analysis 
 
The bivariate probit model is used to estimate the equation where one of the explanatory 
variables, the competition variable, is endogenous.42 The dependent variable is one of the 
advanced services such as packet switching, DS3 or OC. The equation to be estimated is: 
  
Y = f (presence of competition, 271 Approval, RBOCS, medium size ILECs, RUS 
support, UNE price/ embedded cost, # of households, # of employees, federal price cap, 
rural federal classification, SNET variable,43 total # small establishments in SIC 52,44 
                                                 
42 One of the fundamental assumptions for econometrics is that the explanatory variables are 
predetermined.  If they are not predetermined, it will be very difficult to correctly estimate the impact they 
have on the dependent variable.  When one of the explanatory variables (right-hand side variables) is 
endogenous (not predetermined), the coefficient estimates will be biased unless some corrective steps are 
taken.  The two-stage bivariate probit model addresses this concern so that our coefficient estimates will be 
unbiased. To illustrate this concept with a simple example – imagine that we are estimating how the price 
in a market is determined. We know that demand is a function of price (so price is the explanatory variable) 
and we also know that price is not determined solely by the demand for a product, as it is also a function of 
the supply.  If we fail to take into account that both demand and supply simultaneously determine the 
equilibrium price, our parameter estimates will be incorrect. 
 
43 SNET is the abbreviation for Southern New England Telephone, one of the ILECs in Connecticut. SNET 
variable is a dummy variable used in the regressions to control for the deployment of DS and OC by 
Southern New England Telephone (see also Section 4.2.1.2).   
 
44 SIC 52 refers to finance and insurance and SIC 54 refers to professional, scientific and technical services 
(see Section 4.2.4.1). 
 74 
total # medium establishments in SIC 52, total # large establishments in SIC 52, total # 
small establishments in SIC 54, total # medium establishments in SIC 54, total # large 
establishments in SIC 54)        [5.9] 
 
In order to examine the impact of competitive entries into the market on the deployment 
of ATS, the number of wire centers served by CLECs that are located within 3 miles of 
each wire center served by ILECs in 2001 and 2002 are ascertained.45 Data on the 
services provided by the CLECs is not included since data on their products and service 
territories are not as readily available as those for the ILECs. Therefore, the findings only 
reveal the behaviors of the ILECs.  
 
The level of competition (explanatory variable on the right-hand side of the equation) is 
arguably endogenous to the model. When the level of competition is endogenous, the 
level of competition would be correlated with the error term of the model (refer to 
Equation 5.3). In this case, OLS regression will not be able to deliver consistent estimates 
of the parameters of a structural equation. To illustrate, in the equation:  
 
yj = ajY + bjX   + ej    [5.10] 
 
where yj is the availability of ATS, there is a direct dependence of the explanatory 
variable, Y – level of competition on the error term (structural disturbances) of e. 
However, the error term is independent of the exogenous variable in X. A Two-Stage 
estimator – the bivariate probit model or biprobit can be used to overcome this problem. 
Biprobit estimates maximum-likelihood two-equation probit models. Specifically, it is 
run as a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit in which each of the equations has different 
predictors. The equations are not independent since they are computed on the same set of 
subjects (hence the term “seemingly unrelated”). 
 
                                                 
45 Qualitative results do not change if 5, 7 or 10 miles are used.   
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The bivariate probit model allows a two-stage estimation where effectively probit or logit 
is employed at each stage. This avoids the problems of using OLS mentioned in Section 
5.2.2 to estimate the coefficients for binary dependent variables. This is a case of 
recursive, simultaneous equations model:46 
 
Prob [y1 = 1, y2 = 1| x1, x2] = Φ2(β’1x1 + γy2, β’2x2, ρ)  [5.11]  
 
Where the dependent variables y1 = competition variable; and y2 = types of advanced 
telecommunications services (packet switching, DS or OC). The regressor vectors are x1 
and x2. The endogenous nature of one of the variables, the competition variable, on the 
right-hand side of the equation can be ignored in formulating the log-likelihood. Note that 
the ancillary parameter Rho (ρ) in the regression output tables measures the correlation of 
the residuals from the two models in the bivariate probit model. For further details and 
verification, please refer to Greene (2000).  
  
It is postulated that the presence of a CLEC should have a positive impact on ILECs’ 
tariff offering of ATS. Regression analyses confirmed a strongly positive correlation 
between the presence of CLECs in an area and the availability of tariff offering of ATS 
provided by ILECs. In other words, the higher the number of rivals (CLECs) in area of 
each wire center served by ILEC, more advanced telecommunications services will be 
provided by the ILEC wire center. Qualitatively, the results do not change for different 
types of ATS (packet switching, DS and OC), same type of ATS across different years 
(2001 and 2002), across states (50 states in the U.S.), and for different number of miles 
(3, 5, 7 and 10 miles). In this set of regression analyses, the dependent variable is the 
availability of ATS while the independent variables include competitors in different years 
and competitors within different miles of radii. 
 
In particular, ATS availabilities (and level of advanced services) are highest within 
vicinities of large cities like New York City where there are a lot of competition from 
                                                 
46 Greene, William H. (2000), Econometric Analysis, Fourth Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-
Hall 
 76 
CLECs. In the cases of the state of North Carolina and Washington, analyses show that 
ATS has the highest availabilities near cities like Durham, Raleigh, Charlotte and 
Greensboro and Seattle. These are illustrated by Figures 5.3 and 5.4 on the following two 
pages, where the blue dots represent ILEC wire centers; the red squares represent CLEC 
wire centers; and ATS is available where the green and brown diamonds appear on the 
map. The maps show that the competitors and availability of ATS are concentrated in 
large cities.  
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Figure 5.3: DS3 and OC Enabled as of 2001 in North Carolina against Income Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 78 
Figure 5.4: DS3 and OC Enabled as of 2001 in Washington against Income Groups 
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5.3.3 Impacts of Different Regulatory Variables 
 
In the following sections, the impacts of different regulatory variables are examined and 
their implications are presented. It is interesting to observe the correlation of some of 
these regulatory variables in consideration, such as size of the firms (RBOCs, medium 
and small)47; federal price cap regulation; FCC rural classification of nature of carriers; 
and RUS support (see Table 5.2 below). We find that RBOCs are positively correlated to 
federal price caps but have strong negative correlation with the FCC rural classification 
and RUS support – showing most of the RBOC are not classified as rural by FCC and not 
receiving support from RUS. Medium size firms are positively correlated to FCC rural 
classification, federal price caps and RUS support in order of decreasing intensity. This 
shows some of the medium size firms are classified as rural carriers by the FCC and are 
receiving support from RUS. Finally, small firms are positively correlated to FCC rural 
classification and RUS support in order of decreasing intensity but negatively correlated 
to federal price caps. This shows most of the small firms are classified as rural carriers by 
the FCC and are receiving support from RUS.  
 
 
Table 5.2: Correlation of Regulatory Variables 
 
 
                                                 
47 See Section 5.3.3.1 for detailed firm size classification.  
RBOCS Medium Small Price Cap Rural RUS
RBOCS 1.00
Medium Size -0.44 1.00
Small -0.72 -0.30 1.00
Federal Price 
Cap 0.62 0.07 -0.71 1.00
FCC 
Classified 
Rural -0.73 0.14 0.67 -0.83 1.00
RUS Support -0.51 0.03 0.52 -0.63 0.52 1.00
(obs=20755)
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5.3.3.1 Corporate Ownership and Types of Businesses  
 
To investigate the impact of corporate ownership – if medium size firms invest more in 
non-tier one areas (rural areas) than other areas, the ownership of the different wire 
centers has to be identified first. The wire centers are classified into those owned by 
RBOCs (including GTE and SNET), medium sized firms and small size firms. Medium 
size firms include telecommunications companies such as Alltel, Carolina Tel, Century 
Tel, Cincinnati Bell, Citizens Telecom, Frontier, Sprint, United, TDS Telecom and Valor. 
The rest of the firms are classified as small.    
 
As the ILECs and CLECs may target deployment of advanced services in areas that are 
heavy users of communications services, a set of regression that controls for the relevant 
types of industries, specifically for SIC 52 and 54, in each wire center is needed 
(discussed in Section 4.2.4.1). The Wald test is conducted to ascertain if the SICs have a 
jointly positive impact on the availability of advanced telecommunications services. This 
can be done by verifying if jointly the SIC coefficients are zero. If the Prob > chi2 is less 
than 5%, the hypothesis that the joint impact of the SIC coefficients are zero is rejected. 
Different results are obtained from the Wald test for packet switching versus DS and OC 
transport. The hypothesis that the joint impact of the SIC coefficients are zero is rejected 
only for packet switching services – this results in keeping SIC for the packet switching 
regressions (Tables 5.3 to 5.5) but not for the DS and OC regressions (Tables 5.6 to 
5.11). This is hardly surprising as packet switching products (essentially data) would 
seem to be tailored more to a small class of customers versus the DS3 and OC products, 
which would be provided in areas where there are a lot of aggregate traffic (voice, data 
and video). 
  
Results showed that even in the set of regressions that control for those types of 
industries, the level of competition has a statistically positive impact on provision of 
packet switching (Tables 5.3 to 5.5). 
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Regression analyses (Table 5.3) indicate that in 2001, the availability of tariff offering of 
packet switching is positively correlated to wire centers owned by RBOCs and medium 
size firms (as indicated by the positive coefficient) with RBOC ownership showing 
slightly stronger affect. In the case of a more advanced telecommunications service like 
DS3 (Table 5.6), its availability is also positively correlated to RBOC and medium size 
firm ownerships but with medium size firm ownership showing slightly stronger affect. 
This shows that RBOCs have less incentive to provide DS3 services than medium size 
firms. In the case of OC (Table 5.9), the reverse happens – OC availability is positively 
correlated to RBOC ownership but negatively correlated to medium size firm ownership. 
This suggests OC is the level of ATS that the RBOCs are providing while the medium 
size firms usually do not provide OC.    
 
      
5.3.3.2 Forms of Government Regulation and Support 
 
The presence of price cap regulation is postulated to increase the likelihood that ATS is 
available more than the presence of rate-based regulation. Many economists concurred 
with this view. For example, Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller (1995) suggested that 
rate-based regulation has a negative impact on the availability of digital technology.   
 
Regression analyses did not confirm this hypothesis by indicating strongly negative 
correlations between federal price cap regulation and availabilities of packet switching 
(Tables 5.3 and 5.4), DS (Tables 5.6 and 5.7) and OC (Tables 5.9 and 5.10) services. This 
result on price caps is considerably different from that of Greenstein, McMaster and 
Spiller (1995) although this could be due to the differences in the focus of the two studies 
– we focused on services while they studied facilities. All else being equal, the consistent 
findings indicate that there is less of a likelihood that advanced telecommunications 
services are provided in wire centers that are subject to price caps relative to ratebase 
rate-of-return. 
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Similar patterns are observed for different types of ATS (packet switching, DS and OC), 
same type of ATS across different years (2001 and 2002), across states (50 states in the 
U.S.), and across aggregated forms of regulations (price caps versus rate-based 
regulation). In this set of regression analyses, the dependent variable is the availability of 
ATS while the independent variables include: i) different forms of aggregated 
regulations; ii) forms of aggregated regulation across different years; and iii) forms of 
regulation in different states.       
 
The presence of FCC rural classification48 (the classification of rural and non-rural 
carriers by the FCC) has strong negative correlation with the availabilities of packet 
switching (Tables 5.3 to 5.5), DS (Tables 5.6 to 5.8) and OC (Tables 5.9 to 5.11) 
services. All else equal, if classified as rural, lower likelihood of that ATS is provided. 
 
Next, the impact of RUS support is examined. The Rural Utilities Service is a federal 
agency that provides low cost loans to many independent telephone companies. U.S. 
Congress has passed legislation that requires RUS borrowers to make available advanced 
telecommunications services to their retail customers. The important question is if the 
availability of subsidized loans indeed accelerates the availabilities of advanced 
telecommunications services. To address this question, the database includes a field that 
identifies companies that are RUS firms and are able to borrow from RUS. The 
regression analyses indicate that indeed the presence of RUS support (on the firms) has a 
strong positive correlation with the availabilities of packet switching (Tables 5.3 and 5.4), 
DS3 (Tables 5.6 and 5.7) and OC (Tables 5.9 and 5.10) services. In terms of the 
magnitude of the coefficients, RUS support has the most positive impact on OC transport 
services than packet switching and DS3.  
 
 
                                                 
48 Also see section 4.2.5.1. 
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5.3.3.3 FCC 271 Approval Process 
 
In order to provide in-region inter-LATA services under Section 271 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) must file 
applications with the FCC on a state-by-state basis. This is known as the 271 approval 
process. I hypothesize that this process will yield a significant positive impact on the 
development of local competition. To control for 271 activities, the data set included 
information on the dates and names of RBOCs that receive 271 approvals from the FCC. 
Regression analyses have shown that 271 approvals by the FCC have strong positive 
impact on the deployment of packet switching (Tables 5.3 to 5.5) and DS3 (Tables 5.6 to 
5.8) services in different years and across different states. However, for OC services, 271 
approvals show negative impacts on their deployment (Tables 5.9 to 5.11). 
 
 
5.3.3.4 Unbundled Network Element (UNE) Prices and Ratio  
    
To examine the impact of unbundled network element (UNE) prices on the deployment 
(availability) of advanced telecommunications services, we focus on the RBOCs. This 
can be achieved by computing the ratio of the UNE loop price to the embedded cost as a 
proxy for regulatory treatment of collocation, interconnection and UNEs. This ratio 
represents, as explained in Section 4.2.5.1, how friendly the regulatory regime in the 
particular state is to the RBOCs in terms of the unbundling and resale mandate according 
to Section 251(c) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Although the data focuses on 
RBOCs, this ratio can be a good proxy for all companies.  
   
The UNE obligation mandates that ILECs, such as the RBOCs have to satisfy the 
requirements in Section 251(c) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The various 
obligations collectively attempt to facilitate the entry of new providers into local markets 
and increase their ability to compete with the incumbents. For example, the RBOCs have 
to negotiate interconnection arrangements and make available their UNEs to competing 
service providers entering the local market on just, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
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terms and conditions. The procedures for implementing these requirements for ILECs are 
further set forth in Section 252.   
   
The regression results indicate that the availabilities of packet switching (Tables 5.3 to 
5.5), DS3 (Tables 5.6 to 5.8) and OC (Tables 5.9 to 5.11) are strongly and positively 
correlated to the ratio of forward-looking UNE prices to their embedded costs. In other 
words, the RBOCs and other ILECs will increase the deployment of these ATS if UNE 
prices increase more than proportionately to their embedded cost (under suitable 
regulatory regimes).  
 
The regression results have indicated that an increase in the ratio of UNE price to 
embedded cost will trigger an increase in the availability of all advanced 
telecommunications services considered. This suggests that if the government’s objective 
is to encourage deployment of ATS by ILECs, the agencies should suitably increase UNE 
prices relative to their embedded costs. It further suggests that if government regulatory 
bodies like the FCC treat ATS like traditional telecommunications services such as voice 
and start to place them under strict regulation, it will provide a disincentive for the ILECs 
to invest to provide ATS. 
 
 
5.3.4 Supporting Regression Tables  
 
This section contains a selection of important regression results in the form of tables for 
cross-references from the previous sections. These regressions generally make use of 
three sets of response variables of ATS, in the order of packet switching, DS3 and OC, 
with the presence of competitors within 3 miles of ILEC wire centers in 2001 as the 
competition variable. 
  
5.3.4.1 Packet Switching Regression Results49 
                                                 
49 We have the greatest confidence in the packet switching results. DS and OC are point-to-point services. 
For OC and DS, an ILEC might install facilities and not tariff the product, in the hope of being able to 
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Table 5.3: Regression Table with Packet Switching as Response Variable (Constant – Small Size 
Firms) 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =    18437 
                                                    Wald chi2(36)   =    6848.96 
Log likelihood = -13425.191                        Prob > chi2     =       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |      Coef.        Std. Err.      z       P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Packet 2001    | 
Competition    |    .424371   .1178843     3.60   0.000      .193322     .6554201 
271 Approval  |   .4286624    .037301    11.49   0.000     .3555537   .5017712 
RBOCS           |   .9423408    .045055    20.92   0.000     .8540346    1.030647 
Medium size   |   .6622644     .03847    17.22   0.000     .5868646    .7376642 
ILECs  
RUS support     |   .2131896     .03748      5.69   0.000     .1397301    .2866491 
UNE price/      |   1.527147   .0625108    24.43   0.000    1.404628    1.649666 
Embedded $    
# Employees    |    .000023   2.72e-06     8.46   0.000     .0000177    .0000284 
# Households   |   4.84e-06   2.61e-06     1.86   0.063     -2.64e-07    9.95e-06 
Fed price cap   |   -1.05664    .060008   -17.61   0.000    -1.174253   -.9390261 
Rural fed          |  -.5539457   .0573549    -9.66   0.000    -.6663592   -.4415321 
Snet variable    |  -1.724256   .2786221    -6.19   0.000    -2.270345   -1.178166 
# Small est 52  |   .0045594   .0009253     4.93   0.000     .0027458    .0063731 
# Medium est 52 |  -.0404801   .0064804    -6.25   0.000    -.0531815   -.0277786 
# Large est 52  |   .0402867   .0125683     3.21   0.001     .0156533    .0649201 
# Small est 54  |   .0028803   .0004328     6.66   0.000     .0020321    .0037285 
# Medium est 54 |  -.0250288   .0046386    -5.40   0.000    -.0341203   -.0159372 
# Large est 54  |  -.0487679   .0123324    -3.95   0.000     -.072939   -.0245968 
       cons         |  -1.844079   .0840147   -21.95   0.000    -2.008745   -1.679414 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho   |  -.0720215   .0658074    -1.09   0.274    -.2010017    .0569586 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho     |  -.0718973   .0654672                     -.1983378    .0568971 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0:  chi2(1) =  1.19388    Prob > chi2 = 0.2745 
 
Wald Test Results (on Sum of the SIC Coefficients Being Zero):50 
         chi2(  1) =   37.07 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
charge special construction charges.  However, as packet switching is a switched service, if investment in 
the technology is made, a company would want to tariff the service so that customers across the states are 
aware that their packets (of data) can be sent to customers at that particular wire center.   
 
50 As mentioned in Section 5.3.3.1, the Wald test is used to ascertain if the SICs have a jointly positive 
impact on the availability of advanced telecommunications services. If the Prob > chi2 is less than 5%, the 
hypothesis that the joint impact of the SIC coefficients are zero is rejected. SIC 52 and 54 will then be 
preserved in the regression. This occurred for packet switching but not for DS3 and OC. 
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Table 5.4: Regression Table with Packet Switching as Response Variable (Constant – Medium Size 
Firms) 
 
 
 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      14127 
                                                    Wald chi2(34)   =    6473.32 
Log likelihood = -11165.465                           Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        |      Coef.        Std. Err.      z       P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Packet 2001    | 
Competition    |   .7793308   .1107507     7.04   0.000     .5622634    .9963983 
271 Approval  |   .4529325   .0378267    11.97   0.000     .3787935    .5270716 
RBOCS           |   .4840829   .0392581    12.33   0.000     .4071384    .5610274 
RUS support     |   .2679861   .0560133     4.78   0.000     .1582021    .3777702 
UNE price/      |   2.234573   .0800101    27.93   0.000     2.077756     2.39139 
Embedded $     
# Employees   |   .0000213   2.76e-06     7.74    0.000     .0000159     .0000267 
# Households  |   -3.91e-07   2.57e-06    -0.15   0.879     -5.44e-06     4.66e-06 
Fed price cap   |  -1.002504   .0685094   -14.63   0.000     -1.13678   -.8682283 
Rural fed          |  -.2827885   .0627058    -4.51   0.000    -.4056895   -.1598875 
Snet variable    |  -1.553199   .2741773    -5.66   0.000    -2.090576   -1.015821 
# Small est 52  |   .0042785   .0009237     4.63   0.000     .0024681    .0060889 
# Medium est 52 |  -.0397376   .0064818    -6.13   0.000    -.0524416   -.0270336 
# Large est 52  |   .0426785   .0125542     3.40   0.001     .0180727    .0672843 
# Small est 54  |    .002977    .0004279     6.96   0.000     .0021382     .0038158 
# Medium est 54 |  -.0289015   .0045684    -6.33   0.000    -.0378553   -.0199476 
# Large est 54  |  -.0444533   .0121567    -3.66   0.000      -.06828     -.0206266 
       cons         |  -2.004825   .0961973   -20.84   0.000    -2.193368   -1.816282 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho  |  -.3219775   .0686352    -4.69   0.000       -.4565    -.187455 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho  |  -.3112939   .0619842                     -.4272273   -.1852898 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =  20.9792    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
Wald Test Results: 
       chi2(  1) =   34.52 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
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Table 5.5: Regression Table with Packet Switching as Response Variable (Constant – RBOCs) 
 
 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =       9634 
                                                                        Wald chi2(28)   =    4693.34 
Log likelihood = -8010.6008                           Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        |      Coef.        Std. Err.      z        P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Packet 2001    | 
Competition   |   .5972955   .1382823     4.32   0.000     .3262672    .8683238 
271 Approval  |   .4903943   .0391685    12.52   0.000     .4136254    .5671632 
UNE price/      |    3.21005    .1046231     30.68  0.000     3.004992    3.415107 
Embedded $    
# Employees    |   .0000217   3.17e-06     6.83   0.000     .0000154     .0000279 
# Households   |    3.85e-06   2.85e-06     1.35   0.177     -1.73e-06      9.43e-06 
Rural fed          |  -.6916545   .2184438    -3.17   0.002    -1.119797   -.2635125 
Snet variable    |  -1.483891   .2822806    -5.26   0.000    -2.037151   -.9306316 
# Small est 52  |   .0045184   .0010051     4.50   0.000     .0025484    .0064883 
# Medium est 52 |  -.0407063    .006976    -5.84   0.000    -.0543791   -.0270336 
# Large est 52 |   .0499791   .0139344     3.59   0.000     .0226682    .0772901 
# Small est 54  |   .0026242   .0004601     5.70   0.000     .0017224     .003526 
# Medium est 54 |  -.0241919   .0052049    -4.65   0.000    -.0343933   -.0139905 
# Large est 54  |  -.0466287   .0144625    -3.22   0.001    -.0749746   -.0182828 
       cons         |  -3.294817   .0862844   -38.19   0.000    -3.463932   -3.125703 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho  |  -.2130085   .0821153    -2.59   0.009    -.3739516   -.0520654 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho  |  -.2098443   .0784994                     -.3574433   -.0520184 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =  6.50251    Prob > chi2 = 0.0108 
 
 
Wald Test Results: 
         chi2(  1) =   16.97 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
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5.3.4.2 DS Regression Results 
 
 
Table 5.6: Regression Table with DS3 as Response Variable (Constant - Small Size Firms)  
 
 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      20652 
                                                    Wald chi2(24)   =    7275.32 
Log likelihood = -12111.856                        Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                        |      Coef.         Std. Err.      z       P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DS3 2001       | 
Competition    |   .5282805   .0720325     7.33   0.000     .3870994    .6694616 
271 Approval  |   .3372381   .0415698     8.11   0.000     .2557627    .4187134 
RBOCS           |   .6459103   .0388395    16.63   0.000     .5697862    .7220343 
Medium size   |   .8447944    .036315    23.26   0.000     .7736184    .9159705 
ILECs   
RUS support     |    .209976   .0387932     5.41   0.000     .1339426    .2860093 
UNE Price/      |    .364228   .0685613     5.31   0.000     .2298504    .4986056 
 Embedded $    
# Employees   |    8.96e-06   1.29e-06     6.96   0.000     6.44e-06     .0000115 
# Households  |   .0000133   1.79e-06     7.46   0.000     9.83e-06     .0000168 
Fed price cap   |  -1.215787   .0667189   -18.22   0.000    -1.346554   -1.085021 
Rural fed          |  -.5149145   .0636682    -8.09   0.000    -.6397019    -.390127 
SNET variable    |   3.625292    .367923     9.85   0.000     2.904176     4.346408 
       cons           |   -1.14863   .0900921   -12.75   0.000    -1.325207    -.972053 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho  |  -.3015898   .0414386    -7.28   0.000    -.3828081   -.2203715 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho    |  -.2927668   .0378868                     -.3651436   -.2168722 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =  54.8229    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Wald Test Results: 
       chi2(  1) =    0.38 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.5397 
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Table 5.7: Regression Table with DS3 as Response Variable (Constant - Medium Size Firms)  
 
 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      15910 
                                                    Wald chi2(22)   =    6228.19 
Log likelihood = -10325.672                        Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |      Coef.        Std. Err.      z       P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DS3 2001      | 
Competition  |   .5348595   .0670795     7.97   0.000     .4033861    .6663329 
271 Approval  |   .3355981   .0408729     8.21   0.000     .2554887    .4157075 
RBOCS            |   .2858283    .035039     8.16   0.000     .2171531    .3545035 
RUS support  |   .3184637   .0615359     5.18   0.000     .1978555     .439072 
UNE Price/       |   .3164687   .0826533     3.83   0.000     .1544712    .4784662 
Embedded $     
# Employees  |   6.14e-06   1.24e-06      4.96     0.000     3.72e-06     8.56e-06 
# Households  |   .0000102   1.73e-06     5.92    0.000      6.86e-06     .0000136 
Fed price cap  |  -.8358447   .0774187   -10.80   0.000   -.9875826   -.6841069 
Rural fed  |  -.1172988   .0674456    -1.74   0.082    -.2494898    .0148921 
SNET variable |   3.561109   .3620637     9.84   0.000      2.851477     4.27074 
       cons  |  -1.065813    .105974   -10.06   0.000    -1.273518   -.8581077 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho  |   -.395349     .03999    -9.89   0.000    -.4737279   -.3169701 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho  |  -.3759624   .0343375                     -.4412065   -.3067647 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =  103.414    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Wald Test Results: 
         chi2(  1) =    0.00 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9743 
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Table 5.8: Regression Table with DS3 as Response Variable (Constant – RBOCs) 
 
 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      9849 
                                                    Wald chi2(16)   =   4555.35 
Log likelihood = -6407.8941                        Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |      Coef.         Std. Err.      z       P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DS3 2001     | 
Competition  |   .8358382   .1020321     8.19   0.000     .635859     1.035817 
271 Approval |   .3521881   .0427941     8.23   0.000     .2683132     .436063 
UNE Price/      |   .5957317   .1062407     5.61   0.000     .3875038    .8039596 
Embedded $     
# Employees  |    .000014   2.08e-06      6.75   0.000      9.96e-06    .0000181 
# Households  |   .0000147   2.27e-06     6.50   0.000     .0000103    .0000192 
Rural fed  |  -6.337945   154388.8   -0.00   1.000    -302602.9    302590.2 
SNET variable |    3.70456   .3659133    10.12   0.000     2.987383    4.421737 
       cons  |    -2.0412   .0877957    -23.25   0.000   -2.213276   -1.869124 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho  |  -.4264858   .0633641    -6.73   0.000    -.5506772   -.3022945 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho  |  -.4023803   .0531048                     -.5010276    -.293411 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =  43.7301    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Wald Test Results: 
         chi2(  1) =    0.49 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.4827 
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5.3.4.3 OC Regression Results 
 
 
Table 5.9: Regression Table with OC as Response Variable (Constant – Small Size Firms)  
 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      20652 
                                                    Wald chi2(24)   =    7124.95 
Log likelihood =  -8273.444                        Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |      Coef.        Std. Err.      z         P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OC 2001        | 
Competition  |   .9650182   .0800387    12.06   0.000     .8081452    1.121891 
271 Approval  |  -.3952834   .0609992    -6.48   0.000    -.5148397    -.275727 
RBOCS   |   1.149569   .0566604    20.29   0.000     1.038517    1.260622 
Medium size  |  -.1818668   .0787527    -2.31   0.021    -.3362193   -.0275143 
ILECs   
RUS support  |   .2977223    .065137     4.57   0.000      .1700561    .4253885 
UNE Price/       |   1.026241   .0928557    11.05   0.000     .8442475    1.208235 
Embedded $     
# Employees  |   2.96e-06   1.45e-06      2.05   0.040      1.30e-07      5.80e-06 
# Households  |   .0000131   1.96e-06     6.70   0.000      9.27e-06     .0000169 
Fed price cap  |  -1.893951   .2552465    -7.42   0.000    -2.394225   -1.393677 
Rural fed  |  -1.018751   .2548332    -4.00   0.000    -1.518215   -.5192872 
SNET variable |   3.745349   .2878632    13.01   0.000     3.181147     4.30955 
       cons  |  -1.781961   .2595501    -6.87   0.000    -2.290669   -1.273252 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho  |  -.4036413   .0473419    -8.53   0.000    -.4964298   -.3108529 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho  |  -.3830603   .0403952                     -.4593047   -.3012128 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =  76.5727    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Wald Test Results: 
         chi2(  1) =    0.89 
         Prob > chi2 = 0.3465 
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Table 5.10: Regression Table with OC as Response Variable (Constant – Medium Size Firms)  
 
 
 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      15910 
                                                    Wald chi2(22)   =    6565.86 
Log likelihood = -7208.6235                        Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |      Coef.        Std. Err.      z        P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OC 2001        | 
Competition  |   1.201865   .0808901    14.86   0.000     1.043323    1.360406 
271 Approval  |  -.3799126   .0601838    -6.31   0.000    -.4978707   -.2619545 
RBOCS   |   1.370561   .0619729    22.12   0.000     1.249097    1.492026  
RUS support  |   1.327645   .1260033    10.54   0.000     1.080683    1.574607 
UNE Price/    |   1.153286   .1140693    10.11   0.000     .9297145    1.376858 
Embedded $     
# Employees  |   1.69e-06   1.51e-06     1.12   0.263     -1.26e-06      4.64e-06 
# Households  |    .000011   1.99e-06     5.52   0.000      7.08e-06      .0000149 
Fed price cap  |  -.8121162   .6191753   -1.31   0.190    -2.025677    .4014451 
Rural fed  |    -1.3161   .6188203     -2.13   0.033    -2.528966   -.1032348 
SNET variable |   3.966677   .3533955    11.22   0.000     3.274035     4.65932 
       cons  |  -3.202207   .6234048    -5.14   0.000    -4.424058   -1.980356 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho  |  -.5768158   .0553225   -10.43   0.000    -.6852458   -.4683858 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho  |  -.5203472   .0403433                     -.5949191   -.4368941 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =  121.754    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Wald Test Results: 
 
         chi2(  1) =    1.14 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.2847 
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Table 5.11: Regression Table with OC as Response Variable (Constant – RBOCs)   
 
 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =       9849 
                                                    Wald chi2(16)   =    4149.74 
Log likelihood = -5409.4583                           Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |      Coef.        Std. Err.      z        P>|z|      [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
OC 2001        | 
Competition  |   1.067509   .0934306    11.43   0.000     .8843884     1.25063 
271 Approval   |   -.400079   .0609779    -6.56   0.000    -.5195935   -.2805645 
UNE Price/   |   1.356131   .1233036    11.00   0.000      1.11446    1.597802 
Embedded $     
# Employees  |   1.30e-06    1.81e-06      0.72   0.473     -2.25e-06     4.85e-06 
# Households  |   .0000171    2.23e-06     7.66   0.000     .0000127     .0000215 
Rural fed  |  -6.516531   327074.4    -0.00   1.000    -641060.5    641047.5 
SNET variable |   3.999173   .3568219    11.21   0.000     3.299815    4.698531 
       cons  |  -2.827074   .1064417   -26.56   0.000    -3.035696   -2.618452 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho  |  -.5285457   .0609332    -8.67   0.000    -.6479725   -.4091188 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho  |  -.4842686   .0466434                     -.5703035   -.3877242 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0:     chi2(1) =  78.9777    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
Wald Test Results: 
 
         chi2(  1) =    1.30 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.2540 
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6  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Broadband and advanced telecommunications services have been the targets of policy 
makers in various political arenas. The nature and terms of these regulations have become 
part of the competitive process in the deployment of ATS. As mentioned in Chapter 5, 
two main paths toward competition have been conceived: i) unbundling and resale; and 
ii) facilities-based competition. 
 
 
6.1 Unbundling, Resale and Facilities-based Competition 
6.1.1 Unbundling and Resale  
 
Unbundling refers to the division of an ILEC’s network into smaller subcomponents, 
which may either be technology components like phone lines, or service components like 
switching services. These elements can then be sold separately to other 
telecommunications service providers. The main objective of such unbundling and resale 
mandates is to enable new market entrants (e.g. CLECs) to compete with the incumbents 
without the need to undertake the risks and costs of building these elements by 
themselves. There is a distinct difference between physical unbundling of the network 
elements and simple resale of services: in unbundling, the competitors have more 
freedom to provide differentiated services that may combine the unbundled network 
elements with elements originally from the competitors themselves; while with simple 
resale, there is a restriction on the competitors – they can only obtain revenue from the 
differential between the resale and retail rates. 
 
Resale and unbundling mandates evoke a number of concerns both from the perspectives 
of the facilities owners and the competitors. The facilities owners (usually the ILECs) 
have the ability and incentives to leverage on its ownership of the critical inputs that the 
competitors depend on to their disadvantages in the downstream market where the firms 
compete. There is also a possibility that the facilities owners will never fully recoup their 
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costs under the regulator-mandated access prices. Many heated debates have been 
centered on such arguments. Unbundling is supposed to play a crucial role in broadband 
competition and deployment, as originally intended by the policy makers. Some CLECs 
have provided services in areas underserved by the ILECs and the presence of CLECs in 
these areas will further spur the deployment of ATS by the ILECs. However, there are 
major implications for huge investment by the incumbents under such regimes. The 
analytical model and justification on making the incumbents unbundle and resell their 
local network elements implicitly assumes that these networks are based on static 
technologies and involve only deployed facilities. In contrast, network elements have to 
be constantly maintained and upgraded for new capabilities and services to become 
available.  This mandate could pose serious disincentives for the incumbents to invest in 
new facilities and innovate, only to sell their innovations at cost to their competitors. 
Particularly, the incumbents have to bear the high risks of large investment without fully 
benefiting from it under these regulations. 
  
 
6.1.2 Facilities-based Competition      
 
Market players compete directly with one another under this model, utilizing 
independently constructed and operated local access infrastructure.51 A possible solution 
to the unbundling and resale mandate could lie in facilities-based competition – a 
preferred end state by many policy makers, economists and consumer advocates. An 
important argument is that only facilities-based competition is capable of allowing 
complete deregulation of local markets. The local loop unbundling and resale mandate 
could then be used as a transitional approach while facilities-based competition is still 
developing.   
 
 
                                                 
51 Market players in facilities-based competition may still use facilities such as backhaul circuits owned by 
other telecommunications companies (including ILECs) and all facilities-based competitors must 
interconnect with other ISPs that constitute the Internet at some points.   
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6.2 Policy Recommendations  
 
Several improvements can be made to the present policy framework, which centers on the 
1996 Telecommunications Act. Although the importance of broadband data 
communication and services were appreciated by the key policy makers of the 1996 Act 
and reflected in several of the terms involving advanced telecommunications services, the 
crucial role of the Internet and the rapid development of advanced telecommunications 
services were not fully taken into account when the Act was drafted. Much of the Act 
was devoted to the voice telephony market. The Act also uses both policy instruments – 
unbundling and resale, and facilities-based competition to stimulate competition in the 
local networks.  
    
The following is a list of important policy recommendations derived from the results of 
this research: 
 
1. Proactively take steps to promote accelerated deployment of advanced 
telecommunications services, especially at the local level. 
 
This research suggests that attaining nationwide ATS deployment may be an extended 
process requiring a combination careful regulatory measures and incentives. Regulatory 
measures should be applied at the local level to reflect the local conditions while many 
incentives should be locally based due to the wide diversity in local conditions for 
deployment of advanced telecommunications services.    
 
 
2. Encourage new market entrants and local competition to accelerate roll-out of 
advanced telecommunications services.   
 
Increased competition at the local wire center level has a positive impact on the 
deployment of advanced telecommunications services. Suitable regulatory measures and 
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incentives should be employed to increase competition at the local level to stimulate ATS 
deployment. 
 
   
3. Construct regulatory policy framework in such a way as to place more emphasis on 
facilities-based competition over unbundling. 
 
Specifically, in a regulatory environment that is friendly to the ILECs, as indicated by the 
high ratio of unbundled network elements (UNE) prices to the costs it takes to construct 
the loops (embedded costs) in this research, the ILECs are more willing to invest and 
deploy advanced telecommunications services at the local wire center level. This implies 
that the policy framework should favor alternatives to unbundling mandates, such as 
facilities-based competition as the ultimate instrument to stimulate competition. This 
would largely remove the disincentives to investment by incumbents, which will not 
invest or innovate if the benefits derived are not fully captured. Favoring facilities-based 
competition over unbundling would also avoid deterring competitors from investing in 
their own infrastructure since unbundling can inhibit facilities-based competition by 
decreasing the amount of incentives for competitors to construct new facilities or upgrade 
existing ones.       
 
 
4. Use appropriate policy instruments to address the gaps where facilities-based 
competition is unlikely to occur or may occur slowly, such as using rate-based rate-of-
return regulation over price caps. 
 
In areas where population density is low and per-passing cost burden is high, entry by a 
second facilities owner or competitor is unattractive and unlikely to occur. Policy makers 
should anticipate such situations and appropriately use regulatory measures to address 
these noncompetitive markets. For example, in this research, it is shown that rate-based 
rate-of-return (ROR) regulation, where firms are guaranteed a 11.25% rate of return, will 
 98 
increase deployment of ATS more than regulatory measures such as price caps, where 
firms have to accept the financial risks with no guaranteed return on invested capital.   
 
 
5. Understand the impact of mandates in the 1996 Telecommunications Act such as the 
271 approval test on deployment of ATS and utilize such policy instruments 
appropriately. 
 
As shown in this study, effective use of policy instruments such as the 271 inter-LATA 
approval test can be used to accelerate or impede the deployment of advanced 
telecommunications services. This understanding is important for government officials 
and policy makers to set the right regulatory agenda to achieve their goals of widespread 
communications services deployment. 
 
 
6. Formulation of future regulation should focus on service rather than on particular 
transmission technology. 
 
Advanced telecommunications services, like telephony or broadcasting, will be 
constantly subjected to various regulations reflecting various socio-economic and 
political interests. Service and not particular transmission technology should be the focus 
of future regulations as service-centric approaches are more flexible and tolerant of 
technology diversity. This is essential, as advanced telecommunications services will be 
subjected to increasingly rapid changes and greater diversity as information and network 
technologies progress. Such focus on service will encourage technology-independent way 
of describing services and formulation of regulation, making regulatory regimes 
applicable in the long run. 
 
  
 99 
7. More efforts should be made to accelerate ATS deployment, especially in rural areas 
through grants and loans from organizations such as Rural Utilities Services (RUS).    
 
ATS deployment should be promoted in rural areas through more financial incentives in 
the forms of tax credits, grants and loans through agencies such as RUS. This has been 
proven in my research to accelerate the deployment of ATS and enhance the standard of 
business communication in these areas. 
 
 
8. Governments should support more research and development on access technologies, 
especially targeting the needs of non-incumbent players and areas that are not normally 
accessible to secure, private sector funding. 
 
To promote the development and continued deployment of ATS, governments and 
regulatory agencies should support more R&D on access technologies of ATS in general. 
They should place special emphasis on the needs of non-incumbent players and in areas 
that have high cost of providing advanced telecommunications services and are generally 
not accessible to secure private funding. 
   
 
9. Encourage and support continued efforts on more comprehensive and up-to-date data 
collection and research on the underlying socio-economic, political and regulatory 
factors of advanced telecommunications services deployment. 
   
Government and regulatory agencies should encourage more research of this nature and 
scope though financial support such as research grants and loans. More comprehensive 
data collection will enable detailed study and better understanding of the underlying 
social, economic and political impacts of ATS availability; and economic and regulatory 
barriers that may hinder the non-incumbent facilities providers. Ultimately, this kind of 
research would generate very positive impacts on the understanding of ATS deployment 
and measures needed to accelerate such deployment.   
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6.3 Conclusions 
 
Advanced telecommunications services will grow in importance for businesses in the age 
of information technology and digital business. They are powerful tools for 
communications, trade, industrial development, research and innovation. It is important 
for policy makers to understand what is the desirable threshold of government 
intervention to accelerate the deployment of advanced telecommunications services and 
gain an insight on the patterns and factors of their deployment. The concern if most areas 
in the United States will ultimately obtain some forms of advanced telecommunications 
services is just as important as when deployment in rural areas will occur, after such 
services have been made available to the more densely populated areas. 
 
I hope this thesis has shed some light on the topic and shown how certain competitive and 
regulatory forces have impacted the deployment of advanced telecommunications 
services today and how they will continue to shape their deployment tomorrow. 
Sustained efforts on the part of government regulatory agencies and private organizations 
should be encouraged as they are essential to support further data collection, research and 
experimentation on this topic to improve our understanding of the deployment of 
advanced telecommunications services and their impacts on our people.    
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6.4 Future Research 
 
Three main future research areas that require further clarification and insights and are 
worth investigating have been identified: 
 
Research looking at interests of non-incumbents should be encouraged. Much of the 
current research has focused on the interests of incumbents in terms of deployment of 
broadband services, access technologies and other policy and regulatory issues. Research 
looking at the interests and needs of non-incumbents should be encouraged. This could 
increase the quality of services and level of technologies that foster accommodation of 
several competitive service providers over facilities because such technologies may not 
be of direct interests to the incumbents. 
 
More detailed study of the impacts of each form of regulation on different states can be 
conducted. Within each category of regulation such as price cap or rate-of-return, there 
are many forms and intricate details associated with each of them. For example, price cap 
can be combined with service obligations or earnings sharing schemes, while different 
forms of rate-of-return regulatory and incentive schemes have been employed in 
combination or separately in different states. The use of each specific regulatory measure 
depends on the needs of individual state and this could pose interesting research 
questions that will aid our understanding in the deployment of advanced 
telecommunications services.  
      
Comparative studies of deployment of advanced telecommunications services in the 
United States with that of other countries can be carried out. By comparing the current 
status of advanced telecommunications deployment in the U.S. with other countries of 
similar or contrasting socio-economic and political environments, such as other OECD 
countries or even developing countries, we could gain deeper understanding and form 
generalizable frameworks of how certain factors (such as political, regulatory, economic 
barriers and consumer behaviors) have most impacts on their deployment. We could draw 
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lessons from these deployment progress and setbacks abroad to form better conceived, 
more insightful and coherent national broadband policies and strategies. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
Appendix A – List of Acronyms  
 
ABR  Available Bit Rate 
ALT   Alternate Local Transport Companies 
ATM   Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
ATS  Advanced Telecommunications Services 
BOC  Bell Operating Company 
CAD  Computer-aided Design 
CAM  Computer-aided Manufacturing 
CAP  Competitive Access Provider 
CBR  Constant Bit Rate   
CLEC  Competitive Local Exchange Carrier 
CTPID  Center for Technology, Policy and Industrial Development 
DS   Digital Signal Level Technology 
FCC  Federal Communications Commission 
Gbps  Gigabits Per Second 
ICO  Independent Telephone Company 
ILEC  Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier 
ISP  Internet Service Provider 
ITC   MIT Program on Internet and Telecommunications Convergence 
ITU-T  International Telecommunication Union – Telecommunications Standards 
Section 
IXC  Inter-exchange Carrier 
Kbps  Kilobits Per Second 
L  Likelihood Function 
LAN  Local Area Network 
LATA  Local Access Transport Area 
LL  Log of Likelihood Function  
LEC   Local Exchange Carrier 
LERG   Local Exchange Routing Guide  
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LRI   Likelihood Ratio Index 
Mbps  Megabits Per Second 
MIT   Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
NANP  North American Numbering Plan  
NECA  National Exchange Carrier Association  
NRRI  National Regulatory Research Institute 
OC   Optical Carrier  
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OLS   Ordinary Least Squares 
OSI  Open System Interconnection 
PC  Personal Computers 
PDN   Public Data Network 
POP  Point-of-presence  
QoS  Quality of Service 
RBOC  Regional Bell Operating Company 
ROR   Rate-of-return 
RUS   Rural Utilities Services  
SIC  Standard Industrial Code 
SNET  Southern New England Telephone 
SONET  Synchronous Optical Network  
TPRC  Telecommunications Policy Research Conference 
UBR  Unspecified Bit Rate   
UNE   Unbundled Network Element 
VBR  Variable Bit Rate  
VCI   Virtual Circuit Identifier 
WAN  Wide Area Network 
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